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CORE FREEDOMS IN NIGERIAN AND U.S.
CONSTITUTIONS: A STUDY IN DIFFERENCE
GORDON A. CHRISTENSON*
INTRODUCTION: PERSPECTIVES AND METHOD
This article compares core freedoms in the United States Constitution with
similar constitutional experience encountered in the Nigerian Constitution.
It is a study in difference, illuminated by learned papers and discussion of
these issues by judges, lawyers, professors, journalists and activists in
Nigeria. Moreover, to add a third dimension, differences and similarities in
constitutional experiences are shown within the contemporary framework
of international norms.'
Rooted in comparative methodology and anthropological jurisprudence,
the three-dimensional approach respects both difference and sameness in
* University Professor of Law, the University of Cincinnati College of Law.
This article is a substantial reworking of a paper presented and discussions at the 2nd Law Con-
ference, 1988, "Towards a New Legal Order" at Enugu, Anambra State of Nigeria, December
7-9, 1988, under auspices of Anambra State Judiciary; Nigerian Bar Association, Anambra
State; Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria; Faculty of Law, Asutech; and Anambra State
Ministry of Justice. The author was invited by the Conference and attended under the American
Participants Program of the United States Information Agency. Parts of the paper were also
presented as lectures at the Faculty of Law, University of Ibadan; and at the Nigerian Institute
for Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos. The author thanks the faculties, students, members of the
Bench and Bar and the officials in Nigeria who enlightened him about difference. Special thanks
go to my host, Justice P. K. Nwokedi, Chief Judge Anambra State, and to Justice E. Ozobu,
High Court of Justice, Anambra State. I give special thanks to Justice Tijiani Abubakar, High
Court of Justice, Kano State, for help during his visit to the University of Cincinnati College
of Law. Sheila Miller and Steve Demaree have my gratitude for their research assistance. I
greatly appreciate the comments of Beverly Moran, Inyea Ororokuma and David Stoelting.
1 See generally Human Rights in Africa: Cross Cultural Perspectives (A. An-Na'im & F.
Deng, eds. 1990). Questions about the linkages between international human rights and U.S.
constitutional law have a rich beginning literature. See Henkin, Constitutional Rights and
Human Rights, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev 593 (1978); Henkin, Rights: American and
Human, 79 Colum. L. Rev 405 (1979); Lillich & Hannum, Linkages Between International
Human Rights and U.S. Constitutional Law, 79 Am. J. Int'l L. 158 (1985); Lillich, The
United States Constitution and International Human Rights Law, 3 Harv. Human Rights
Yearbook 53 (1990) (summary of scholarship and problems to the present). Lester traces the
influence of the American experience indirectly to former colonies now states in Africa,
through the European Convention on Human Rights. Lester, infra note 14, at 541-42. See J.
Read, The Protection of Human Rights in Municipal Law, in Human Rights: The Cape Town
Conference 156 (C. Forsyth & J. Schiller eds. 1979); R. Lillich, The Promotion of Human
Rights by Domestic Courts: A Comparative Approach, in The Individual Under African Law:
Proceedings of the First All-Africa Law Conference 160 (P. Takirambudde ed. 1982). For a
constitutional process of interpreting negative limitations, see Christenson, Using Human
Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 3
(1983). For the relationship involving criminal law and procedure in U.S. constitutional law,
see H. Hannum, Materials on International Human Rights and U.S. Criminal Law and Proce-
dure (1989).
3 RADIC (1991)
HeinOnline  -- 3 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 276 1991
   I I   . . 
I I S:     
 .  
I :   
l    s    it  
 tit tional i e tered i ri  t ti . 
   ,    rs  f 
s, , s rs, t    
i . er,   i , s    
ti l ri ces    t rary  
 l . 1 
 ti  l y  l ical ce, 
t  t r - i ensional a r ac  res ects t  iffere ce a  sa e ess i  
* University Professor of Law, the University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
 t tial   r    
, , ards er"  t   r 
,    ;  ,  
; lt   , it     ra  
   t r      
i ts r    it   ti  . t   t  r  l  
  ;   i   
 ,    , ,   t  
      .  t  
t, i,     . , 
 i l j  ,  
 , ,  it    
   .  
i t       
I l tives . '   
, ).        i t   . . 
l . i , stitutional  
 , . ); ,   
, );  , tional 
 titutional ! ;  
it   tit tion  t rnational   
  i   
   tl    
   , . . 
, tion    i ipal , i  n t :  
    tion n 
 ti  urts: parative , i idual r   
dings  st   . .   
l ,  i g n 
ess  l t ction  
3).  r  . l  




Core Freedoms in Nigerian and U.S. Constitutions 277
the separate cultures while adding to a traditional comparative constitu-
tional study contemporary respect of norms from the international
community.2 This approach compares different structures supposedly
derived from the same values (core freedoms, cooperation and national
unity) with different cultures supposedly leading to similar constitutional
structures (a strong executive; an independent judiciary; separation and
division of powers). Core value-thinking thus does not become either a
metaphysical problem of derivation of values from universals nor an exer-
cise in the cultural relativism of radical empiricism or skepticism that
negates shared value. It does postulate respect for another culture in time,
place and perspective. Also, the method is optimistic for it postulates the
possibility of common core values but only after seeing difference. In this
inquiry, respect fosters comparative method among the races and ethnic
groups, between sexes and among religions and nationalities, for to affirm
the worth of another is not to deny one's own dignity.
In addressing the African Leadership Forum, Nigeria's former President,
General Olusegun Obasanjo spoke to all Africa as the Nigerian Constituent
Assembly began revision of its 1979 Constitution: "In the last resort, only
we ourselves know what is really amiss with us and, what is more, only we
as Africans can tell it as it is to ourselves .... Our destiny ultimately lies in
our own hands.",
5
By choosing self-help and rejecting Western condescension, Nigerians
confront many concrete and painful problems. Their constitution, written
and unwritten, evolves to fit conditions in Africa. Rampant corruption of
officials and citizens, an ongoing problem of serious proportions in Nigeria,
requires both a national ethic to restrain raw selfishness and more effective
policing of corruption without unduly repressing freedoms. The problem of
2See e.g., C. Levi-Strausse, Structural Anthropology (1963); G. Geertz, The Interpretation
of Cultures (1973); E. Bodenheimer, The Philosophy and Method of the Law (rev. ed. 1974);
E. Bodenheimer, Power, Law and Society: A Study of the Will to Power and the Will to Law
(1973); L. Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory (1971); L. Pospisil, The
Ethnology of Law (2nd ed. 1974); J. Hall, Comparative Law and Social Theory (1973); H.
Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures (1976); E. Hoebel, The Law of Primative Man: A
Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics (1954); F. Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and
Ethical Experience (1959); F. Northrop, The Taming of the Nations: A Study of the Cultural
Bases of International Politics (1987); F. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry
Concerning World Understanding (1979). This Article is distinct from other comparative
approaches in that it undertakes a three-way comparison, involving not only the legal cultures
in the two countries studied but also international agreements.
3 See, A. Renteln, International Human Rights, Universalism v. Relativism (1990).
4Karl Llewellyn, himself a noted scholar of folk-ways and the anthropological method,
thought that the greatest legal fallacy in reasoning was the proposition, "if A, then not B".
(expressio unius est exclusio alterius). The better logical expression should be "if A then also
B". W. Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (1973). See for example, E. Hoebel
and K. Llewellyn, The Cheyenne Way; Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence
(1941).
5 As reported by Flora Lewis, Straight Talk in Africa, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1988, §4 at 23.
See C. Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria 1-3 (1983); 0. Obasanjo, Africa Embattled 5 (1988)
("If our system and structure have to evolve like those of most settled industrial societies, it
would take time but it must be our own, designed by ourselves for ourselves").
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278 Gordon A. Christenson
economic decline requires national will and sacrifice to re-establish local
productive agriculture and business, with markets and prudent development
policies.6 Structural upheavals since independence in 1960, with their vast
displacements of populations and local economies have led directly to
increased measures of control, repression and abuses of human rights.7 And
the contradiction between written guarantees of human rights and the inca-
pacity of the benevolent state to protect and provide produces varying con-
stitutional crises.8
Nigerian writers speak and write unceasingly about these struggles.
Chinua Achebe, one of the most prominent, begins by a frontal rejection of
traditional Western intellectual attitudes towards Africa. No one who is
enlightened and cosmopolitan, he asserts, can quite grasp the concept of
Africa. Achebe tells human stories that draw us inside a rich and diverse
culture amidst radical change. Intellectuals in Europe and America, he
argues, have used tactics of evasion. They seem to listen, but only carry on
a brilliant monologue. 9 As a "missionary in reverse" to the West he has
sought, well before the current fashion, to unmask the so-called "univer-
sal" tradition, revealing the lie about Africa that emanates from Western
writers such as Joseph Conrad, whom he calls "a thorough-going racist"."
Achebe thinks "the whole picture of Africa has been built upon small lies,
big lies, distortions and blindnesses". Half the ancient Greek vocabulary
comes from Africa, he points out, and African influences on cubism and
Western art go unnoticed. 12 Talk of Western "migrations" ignores African
migrations Westward through the slave-trade and others not forced.
Western cultures have little respect for tribal customary law and practices,
depite the high value customs place on communal life and interpersonal
relationships. Conrad's The Heart of Darkness, not a great work of art for
Achebe, symbolises this blindness, for it eliminates Africa as human.
12
6 Economic decline continues, fueled by corruption and leading to riots. See N.Y. Times,
Int'l Sec., June 4, 1989, at 3 and N.Y. Times, June 19, 1989, at 34.
7 Id. Stringent measures result in unrest, riots and further repressive measures.
s The Civil Liberties Organisation formed in Lagos in 1987 has documented "a continuous
stream of cases illustrating shortcomings in Nigeria's judicial and law enforcement systems."
Noble, "In Nigeria, to Rot in Jail Is a Hazard of the Innocent," N.Y. Times, Int'l Sec., June
29, 1989, at 5.
9A popular exception is S. Unger, Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Conti-
nent (3rd rev. ed. 1989).
10 See his lecture at Amherst in 1975, in C. Achebe, lope and Impediments, Selected Essays
(1988).
11 See also M. Bernal, Black Athena: The Afro-Asiatic Roots of Classical Civilisation (1987)
(arguing that Greek civilisation owes a debt to African and Middle eastern cultures).
12 "That this simple truth is glossed over in criticisms of his [Conrad's] work is due to the
fact that white racism against Africa is such a normal way of thinking that its manifestations
go completely unremarked. If you say to the West this is unacceptable, they will be shocked.
Some will even resist it: they'll be kicking and screaming all the way, even as you drag them
through the facts.... Can nobody see the preposterous and perverse arrogance in thus reduc-
ing Africa to the role of props for the breakup of one petty European mind?" Interview with
Chinua Achebe, by Zia Jaffrey, in Elle, Oct. 1989, 208-210. In novels, short stories and other
books, Achebe and other contemporary Nigerian writers seek their own authentic voices for
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The transition to the Third Republic, from military to civilian govern-
ment proceeds under a Constitution newly revised by the Constituent
Assembly that President Babangida appointed in May 1988. 13 Nigeria faces
these most difficult problems at the very time when all eyes are on events
elsewhere, driven again by Western Values. The constitutional crises and
opportunities, as in all great historic moments there or elsewhere, evoke the
simplest and most profound purpose of all governments ensuring human
security while protecting human freedoms and providing for human needs
and dignity. Similar problems in different forms plague even the most
advanced constitutional democracies. While the export of human rights and
democracy has seemed a trade monopoly of the United States and the
West, 14 a new Europe and the Americas might learn from the other direc-
tion, seeing the world through constitutional lenses different form their
own. Unlike Eastern Europe with its revolutions that are ideologically com-
fortable to the West, Africa offers a fresh perspective closer in many ways
to ethnic and national structures of the Middle East, especially in the
influence of Islam, in confronting the problems of nations and power, of
security and freedom.' 5
their own land. One way to get attention, they have found paradoxically, is to
exclude. Nigerians now are their own judges, on their own, seeking their own way. See in par-
ticular, C. Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (1983) ("simply and squarely a failure of
leadership").
13 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) Decree 1989, Decree No.
12, Suppl. to Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 29, Vol 76, May 3, 1989-Part A, A 61. The
revised Constitution as promulgated and scheduled for coming into force by October 1, 1992,
is published as part of the Decree No. 12, at A 71 [hereinafter cited as Nig. Const. of 1989].
See also Decree No. 13 (dissolving the Constituent Assembly), id. at A 215; Decree No. 14
(transition to civil rule and lifting the ban on politics) id. at A 217.
14See Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 537
(1988); Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
Than States, 32 Am. Univ. L. Rev. 1, 32-64 (1982).
15 For example, see Richard Joseph's essay, Glasnostfor Africa, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1989,
at 23: "The majority of African states have been implementing for several years the same deep
structural reforms in their economies that Eastern Europe is now undertaking: greater reliance
on the market in setting prices and exchange rates, the closing or privatisation of inefficient
state enterprises, the reduction of subsidies and swollen bureaucracies and the encouragement
of private investment, both domestic and foreign". Joseph wants a Western version of glasnost
to be applied to Africa. "The United States and the world community should insist that con-
stitutional government and the rule of law be restored to all the people of sub-Saharan Africa
and extended to those still oppressed by white minority rule in South Africa." He points out
that demands for democracy, accountability and pluralism by the African people inevitably are
greeted with "harsh repression" and he urges no financial assistance without glasnost. "Let us
hear the true voices of the people. Let us hear more from Africa's silenced Lech Walesas and
Vaclav Havels. Americans usually respond to such voices-but first they must be heard."
To criticise the muted voices from Africa and to ask where they are reinforces the point
Achebe is making, supra note 12: Anyone travelling to Africa curious enough to listen hears
many powerful voices. Achebe would have them speak more effectively to a few like the singer
asked to dance to a deaf audience. Through this metaphor of difference, we might listen again
to the words of Obasanjo (quoted by Joseph to make his quite different point): "We are
amazed to the point of frustration as we watch substantial amounts of funds being appropri-
ated for economic reforms in just a few countries of Eastern Europe, while we continue to wait
for the West to honor its far more modest financial commitments" already made in Africa.
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280 Gordon A. Christenson
We shall see stark difference in the structures and values in each constitu-
tion. There are also similarities, but we see them more clearly only in the
light of difference, when we cease viewing human rights and democracy for
Africans, for example, as a universally-derived Western gift. The method
also employs difference as a strategy to aid in seeing common ground in the
human condition. Respecting each country's culture does not deny the pos-
sibility of common aspirations or common constitutional freedoms, a
common fallacy leading from cultural relativism. Those freedoms most
important to contemporary societies of different kinds and at different
stages of development then might be seen as reciprocal gifts, even if univer-
sal moral truth is neither denied nor asserted as knowable.
After comparing the ways each country chooses to contain factions and
corruption of civil society or community, this article proceeds to compare
the American constitutional experience conveniently symbolised by
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "four freedoms" with similar core freedoms
in the newly revised Nigerian Constitution of 1989 and, in turn, with
various international human rights norms and the African Charter of
Human and Peoples' Rights.
FACTIONS, CORRUPTION AND STRUCTURE
Factions can be described empirically in the culture of any society, even
though the Madisonian version is a product of the Western Enlightenment.
Factions are groups of people each bound by common passion such as
communal loyalty, ethnicity or interest that advances their particular goals
arguably at the expense of others (requiring individual or group sacrifice
should the faction prevail nationally in a rule of law) or the common good
(requiring aggregate long term interest to yield to the short term interest of
a dominant faction or elite).
16
The American Constitution organises unified power while avoiding
tyranny, political disintegration and the corruption of power by structuring
power to contain the evils of factions. Through limiting terms of elective
office, distancing representatives from the citizenry and checking ambition
against ambition, the founders subjected potential corruption of republican
officials to popular scrutiny and contained if not prevented it outright.
In contrast, Nigerian traditions have little in common with the Western
traditions of a good society grounded in the Enlightenment revival of
reason and balance between republican civic virtue and individualism (both
rational and romantic). In Nigeria, the problem of factions arises mainly
from change in the bonds of ethnic and customary personal relationships
16 See, for example the description of Nigeria's social order, Elites and Social Stratification
in Nigeria, A Country Study, 113-36 (H. Nelson, ed. 4th ed. 1982) (emphasising the three
ethnic tribal groupings, the Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo, and the absence of class consciousness
except through the emerging status acquired from secondary education with its access to privi-
leged positions and professions).
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without a corresponding shift to strong personal allegiance to the nation. 17
Corruption of officials easily follows. In more than thirty years of indepen-
dence since 1960, Nigeria has had two periods of civilian rule, but six coups
d'etat. 18 Corruption and vote-rigging in the last period of civilian rule, from
1979 to 1983, when the military ousted the civilian government of the
Second Republic, led the Armed Forces Council of the succeeding military
government to anticipate similar evils in planning elections to return to
civilian government in 1992. After promulgating the revised Constitution by
decree in May 1989, the military government took paternal steps to ensure
a two-party system. The aim was to prevent weakness from a possible
proliferation of parties and resulting contention.1 9 The government decree
also prohibits any person who has ever held elective office from serving in
the next civilian government.2 0 Apart from its structure of federalism and
separation of powers, the Nigerian Constitution of 1989 also seeks to fore-
stall the emergence of a ruling faction by continuing the mandate of the
1979 Constitution that "there shall be no predominance of persons from a
few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government
,,21or in any of its agencies".
Both countries, though culturally different, have used plurism and the struc-
ture of dividing and separating power to control corruption by self-interested
factions seeking power adverse to the common good of each tradition. In
Nigeria, the present military government seeks to consolidate institutional
controls through national and local police and federalism, with courts of all
levels. In the United States, the tradition of pluralism and civic virtue with
federalism in the structure of government, tends to contain corruption 2 2
17 Id.
'8For a short popular version, see S. Unger, supra note 9, 121-161.
9 Noble, All Names Will Be New on Nigeria's Next Ballot, N.Y. Times, Int'l Sec., Jan. 14,
1990, at 6. See 20. Legum, The Coming of Africa's Second Independence, 13 The Washington
Quarterly 129, 134-39 (1990) (one-party system of rule in Africa, especially in Nigeria, has
failed). Similar concerns were expressed during the Obasanjo military government in its efforts
to insulate the new civilian government under the 1979 Constitution from conditions leading
to the military coup in 1966: proliferation of political parties, constitutional issues, north-
south and ethnic conflicts, corruption, internal strife and demands for new states. Supra note
17 at 220, 269-75. The Shagari civilian government was unable to contain the pressures, and
the military coup of 1983 ousted the four-year old civilian government. A bloodless coup in
1985, also military, by the current President, General Babangida, promised a return to civilian
rule under a revised constitution.20 Noble, supra note 20. President Babangida, the military governor, announced in October,
1989, as he outlawed all political parties except the two sanctioned for elections, that he was
determined to diminish the traditional pressures of tribe, religion and money. "This Govern-
ment will not allow itself to fail in its duty by succumbing to the manipulation of those who
want to use cheap and dangerous religious and ethnic loyalties for selfish political ends. We
will not serve our people yesterday's food in glittering new dishes." In driving the thirteen
other parties underground and stopping most political activity, President Babangida justified
the measure by tying the tendency to corruption to "the traditional pressures of tribe, religion
and money, which still exert great influence here". Id.
21Nig. Const. of 1979, art. 14(3); Nig. Const. of 1989, art. 15(3).
22 Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 (1984); but see
Nelson, infra note 24.
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A. Historical Conditions: Separating and Dividing Power
In the political debates prior to ratification of the United States Constitu-
tion in 1787, the argument against factions was particularly effective for the
pro-constitution forces. They justified the union of thirteen states with
separated national powers by explaining the danger to civil government of
powerful special interest groups or factions that corrupt civic virtue of the
republican polity. 23 The fear that factions corrupt government found
expression in Hume's skepticism about the human propensity to use power
virtuously when wielded ostensibly for the public good by representatives of
the people.24 Moderating the corrupting influence by separating and divid-
ing counterpoised power centers might not affirm public virtue, but it
would check the tendency of a party or branch to assume absolute power by
rewarding one's friends and punishing one's enemies.
Tradition in Nigeria draws less from a democratic polity with representa-
tives engaged in deliberation or bargaining and more from the ideal-type of
the ethnic community under a single wise king or chief who embodies and
dispenses local custom. 26 More closely akin to a Homeric tradition of kings
than a Periclean tradition connecting citizens of the polis and public leader,
the ancient communal and ethnic conditions in what is now Nigeria yields
23 The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison). For a discussion of the meaning and importance of
republicanism, see Shallope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 William
and Mary Q. 334 (3rd ser. 1982).
24 Factions played an important role in the distinction between moral norms of right and
those of economic regulation in eighteenth-century pre-revolutionary America. Professor
William Nelson has traced the history of the political structure during this crucial period by
considering the distinction through the operation of factions (a distinction later articulated in
the famous footnote four of Carolene Products). He argues that this history illuminates the
deepseated political structures and values that continue to account in part for greater deference
for majoritarian economic regulation than for moral. W. Nelson, The Eighteenth Century
Constitution As a Basis for Protecting Personal Liberty, in Constitution and Rights in the early
American Republic (W. Nelson & R. Palmer, ed.) 15, 18, 42-52 (1987). Nelson suggests "that
eighteenth-century American governments legislated freely to promote economic growth and
to distribute the gains of growth to favoured factions. Moral norms, in contrast, could not be
imposed by legislation simply because dominant groups favoured them. Morality could be
translated into law only when the community had arrived at a substantial consensus about its
rightness" Id. at 18. This understanding of factions informs the need for moral consensus
before legislating (the opposite of the modern court's deference to the majority unless there is
a moral consensus about a fundamental right) and the check on corruption through separation
and division of powers.
See also, D. Farber & S. Sherry, A History of the American Constitution (1990).25 The Federalist No. 51 (J. Madison).
26 See Asiedu-Akrofi, Judicial Recognition and Adoption of Customary Law in Nigeria, 37
Am. J. Comp. L. 571 (1989); Obasanjo, supra note 6; Butler, The 1979 Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Constitution of the United States of America: A Historical
and Philosophical Comparison, 30 How. L. J. 1025 (1987). But see H. Nelson (ed.) supra note
17 at 114: "Nigerians-even those of a given ethnic category-do not have a unanimous view
of the worth of emirs, obas (kings), or of occupations requiring a modern education. Some
may defer to the power of a wealthy businessman or an educated bureaucrat but regard the
incumbents of such positions as less worthy of deference than an oba or vice versa .... [Miany
women among the Kanuri are not persuaded that maleness confers higher status, although they
may be powerless to change the system in the near future".
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more readily to corruption and faction when upset. Newly independent
Nigeria ostensibly adopted American separation and division of powers
model in the 1979 Constitution and it continued into the 1989 Constitution.
The structure in fact, however, weakened traditional ways of dealing with
factions through ostracism or community shame and has not yet repro-
duced the hoped-for modern American equilibrium. The intellectual
Marxist ideology favoured by many elites discounted the liberal state's
checks and balances that drew boundaries between a limited public domain
and an energetic private sector. Critical Marxist rhetoric often appears in
print in Nigeria, despite clear recognition that Marxist economics has led to
as much corruption in the public sector by socialist elites driven by their
own self-interest as by capitalist elites in theirs.2 7
The goal of weakening local or ethnic loyalties in Africa and transferring
them to national unity with renewed allegiance and protection poses the
twin problem of nation-building and development. The architecture of both
Nigerian and American Constitutions seeks equilibrium in power relation-
ships among many groups to achieve national unity. Even with similar aspi-
rations for balance in power, different political cultures and traditions
produce different means of development and modernisation. An early
structure of private property and liberty in the United States framework
with constitutionally protected private spheres for economic activity has an
entirely different meaning in post-colonial Nigeria. After an initial period
of central control over the economy, including land reform measures osten-
sively placing all land under state ownerships or control, Nigerian policy
now prefers privatisation. Possession, a community-bound tradition, of
land and things became the basis of new property with a glass from English
common law on transferring in effect title. Reduction of the parastatal
state-owned enterprises proceeds apace in favour of private capital invest-
ment needed from outside. The culture of communal property for political
purposes while creating a new private enterprise economic culture for
development and modernisation. 8
Federalist-drawn structures also differ in each constitution. The
American Constitution in dividing the popularly delegated powers between
the expressed powers of the national government and the reserved powers of
newly-independent individual states, retained the incentive for development
in the people where commerce and civil society customarily had abided. The
Civil War Amendments increased the national power but did not change its
character. The Nigerian Constitution of 1979, on the other hand, emerged
after a bloody three-year civil war in which some but not all of its nineteen
27 In most of Africa, according to this rhetoric, the hegemonic factions of the bourgeoisie
have resorted to political violence of a scale and kind that virtually amounts to fascism. While
this massive political violence has enabled the bourgeoisie to hang on, the argument goes, it is
at the same time deepening and radicalising the contradictions between them and the masses.
C. Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa 37 (1978).28 Legum, supra note 20, at 132.
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284 Gordon A. Christenson
states had prior territorial autonomy and few had a tradition of develop-
ment.2 9 Ethnic influence had been powerful at independence, but offered
little incentive for development once the economy was centralised. The
three African ethnic cultures remained largely non-territorial, even if con-
centrated in certain regions.3°
While the second Nigerian republic had nineteen states, the 1979 Consti-
tution creating them patterned the structure after the federal system of the
three regions (reflecting ethnic or religious cultures) that retained in the first
constitutional grant by the British. 31 The Constitution of 1989 adds two
more states for a total of twenty-one (plus the Federal Capital Territory).32
While allowing ethnic culture, each Nigerian constitution has sought to
break ethnic allegiance and modernise the country through a national
economy, including state trading of traditional products.
In the United States, the thirteen states previously had declared them-
selves independent and reserved all sovereign powers that their representa-
tives speaking for an entire people had not expressly delegated. Even before
independence, the English colonies haled congresses with themselves and
Indian tribes to protect common interests.33 Incentives for enterprise and
expansion abounded, especially on the frontier where development was a
way of life.34 Hamiltonian national commerce competed with the Southern
mercantilism economy dependent upon European markets.
In the Nigerian Constitution of 1979, the Constituent Assembly created
or revised a comprehensive structure of government, almost out of whole
cloth, with rights and duties spelled out for everyone, from the top down.
The federal government, the states and the citizens all have rights and
duties, as enumerated in some detail in the Constitution. No others are
retained expressly. All essential relationships are constitutional and organic.
The old communal relationships are transformed into those for the nation
as a whole. While the culture of village community has been preserved,
the nation-building process directly challenges this tradition, seeking organ-
ically to transfer it to the nation, while keeping alive local custom and
organisation.
The framers of both Nigerian and American constitutions separated
national power among three national branches. While Nigeria separated
powers after a brief experiment with a parliamentary system that formed the
base for its first constitution, the new political structure of the second repub-
lic in 1979 favoured a much stronger executive in fact than the United States
adopted out of suspicion both of Monarch and Parliament. This revision
29 H. Nelson, supra note 16 at 120-22.
30 See Sinha, The Axiology of the International Bill of Human Rights, 1 Pace Y. B. Int'l L.
21, 45 (1989).
31 Crowder and Abdullahi, infra note 96, at 188-89.
3 2 Nig. Const. of 1989, art. 3(1) (the States of Akwa Ibom and Katsina added to original 19).33 R. Frothingham, The Rise of the Republic of the United States 118-121 (8th ed. 1902).34 J. Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United States
(1956). See especially Chapter 1.
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continued under the 1989 Constitution under the watchful eye of what appears
to be a reappearing phenomenon, a transitional military executive ostensibly
guarding against civilian corruption.35 The very reason for a strengthened exe-
cutive branch under a modified separation of powers system gives legitimacy
for a strong leader, often military from the ethnic chieftain cultures. Even in
the United States a strong monarchical tradition resides in the Presidency.
B. The Judiciary and the Political Branches
The judicial branches in each constitution, while separate from the other
branches, operate differently. The American Supreme Court heads a separate
and independent judicial branch with power of judicial review it exercises with
varying degrees of restraint upon the national legislative and executive
branches and upon the states. The Nigerian judicial branch while independent
remains more differential to the political branches, because judicial review of
legislation and state action does not have the same status as in the United
States. 36 The executive exercises greater control over appointment and termi-
nation of judges. The appointment or recognition of various courts in addition
to the federal courts remains explicit. State high courts, courts of appeal, tradi-
tional and customary courts and Sharia courts all operate under the provi-
sions of the comprehensive Constitution. Under emergency decrees of the
military government, pending transition under the 1989 Constitution, only
the judicial branch still operates quasi-autonomously. While the Constitu-
tion permits such emergency decrees, the courts still might order release of
a person held if not properly charged, if the matter reaches the courts. A
problem, however, is that not all arrests reach the courts; nor are the judges
inclined to find decrees invalid.37 The extent of the power of judicial review
of the constitutionality of statutes or executive orders remains uncertain. 8
Judges in both state and federal courts at all levels in Nigeria appear well-
educated and respected. 39 They are behind in case-load, have inadequate
35 See Obasanjo, supra note 6 at 4-6. See also, C. Mwalimu, The Influence of Constitutions
on the Development of a Nation's Law and Legal System; The Case of Zambia and Nigeria,
8 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 157, 176-77 (1989).36 Okere, Judicial Activism or Passivity in Interpreting the Nigerian Constitution, 36 Int'l &
Comp. L. Q. 788 (1987). For a description of the juducial system in Nigeria, see Aguda,
Development in the Adjudicatory System in the Challenge of the Nigerian Nation: An Exami-
nation of Its Legal Development, 1960-1985 (T. Aguda ed. 1985).
37 See Locked away in an Island Prison, The Guardian, Sept. 18, 1988, at 5; Dept. of State,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (1988), Brooke, Nigerian Leader's Political
Agility Keeps Trouble at Bay and Him in Power, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1988, at A6, col. 1.38 For a discussion of this issue under the Nigerian Constitution of 1979, see T. Aguda,
Development in the Adjudicatory System in The Challenge of the Nigerian Nation: An Exami-
nation of Its Legal Development, 1960-1985 (T. Aguda ed. 1985) and C. Okpaluba, Challeng-
ing the Constitutionality of Legislative Enactment in Nigeria: The Factor of Locus Standi,
1982 Public Law 110 (1982).
" Judges in Nigeria have to deal with a complex body of law, because different yet equally
valid systems of law exist. See Salamone, The Clash Between Indigenous, Islamic, Colonial
and Post-Colonial Law in Nigeria, 21 J. Legal Pluralism 15 (1983) and J. Anifalaje, Judicial
Development of Customary Law in Nigeria, 9 J. Legal Hist. 40 (1988).
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286 Gordon A. Christenson
support and often write their own summaries of testimony by hand. Yet, in
the Anglo-American tradition, they are highly competent and contribute
greatly both to social stability and to a sense of hope for at least the
emerging Nigerian middle-class. Elite judges appointed by the federal and
state executives seem to steer clear of scandal and maintain independence
and legitimacy. 40 Reports of corruption in the press seem more closely
associated with linking officials and business opportunities or bribes than
with corruption of judges. 4 '
The press reports controversial law cases as if the courts were accepted by
the people. Quite clearly, however, creation of more positions of judges and
more efficient court administrators will be necessary if the courts are to
fulfill a major role in maintaining order and justice in a complex, highly
customary and decentralised social structure. In customary societies courts
or councils in one form or another historically have maintained some
modicum of social order in resolving the most troublesome of everyday dis-
putes.4 2 Tension remains nevertheless between traditional cultural
expectations and modern change such as the economic. administrative and
legislative measures required for building and governing a modern nation.
Social policies favoured by courts in helping to adjust to change could prove
greatly advantageous to constitutional government. Perhaps for this
reason, among others, the military government shows deference and
reluctance to interfere with or to manipulate the courts overtly.
Nevertheless, the military government appeals to populist sentiment to
hold the courts politically accountable in the time of transition to civilian
government and sometimes intervenes. In public addresses, the state
military governments may press judges (with the same rhetoric used by
politicians in the United States) to simplify the law and make it less
technical; to protect the human rights of the average citizen against violence
and corruption; to get by without more scarce resources of court personnel
and office space; and to set examples against corruption and crime by
prompt convictions and severe punishment. 4 The military government
shrewdly keeps the courts from too activist a role or from too much power.
Three executive branch interventions into legal process have been
effective. First, the President, General Babangida, withdrew the issue of
Sharia or Muslim law from the Constituent Assembly's agenda during the
recent revision of the 1979 Constitution. That Constitution banned state
40 See generally, R. Ola, Introduction to Nigerian Administration (1988).
41 Outright pay-offs of political friends were seen to displace the traditional custom of dis-
pensing favour to one's supportive tribe or elders. This cultural shift and the tragic dilemmas
posed for the new Nigerian elites can be seen best through novels such as Chinua Achebe,
Things Fall Apart (1958); No Longer At Ease (1960); A Man of the People (1966); and The
Anthills of the Savannah (1987). The stories of Ben Okri likewise expose the old myths used
to keep the new generation in its place and show personal life and corruption in modern
Nigeria. See, especially, B. Okri, Stars of the New Curfew (1988).42 Supra note 2, references to primitive law sources.
43 Address of Col. Robert N. Akonobi. Military Governor of the State of Anambra, Second
Anambra Law Conference, Enugu, Nigeria, 7-9 December 1988.
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religion and protected religious freedom, but it also empowered the states to
establish Sharia courts to resolve appropriate disputes using Muslim
personal law." The review and possible revision of these provisons alarmed
many of the 497-member assembly. Negotiating strategies emerged to seek
advantage to both Christian and Muslim constituencies. Political commen-
tators speculated that if the President had not withdrawn the jurisdiction
under his power to control the agenda, the Assembly would have reached a
compromise consensus along the lines of the 1979 Constitution. Others
believed the President acted prudently and astutely to avoid a potential
impasse that could have erupted in violence between Christians and
Muslims. 45 Whichever view is the better one, the courts, ultimately the
Supreme Court of Nigeria, will have to work out any conflicts, one case at
a time, thus diffusing potential violence between religious factions. In effect
the President's intervention and popular acquiescence legitimated the old
constitution's provisions and strengthened the courts.
A second intervention occurs when the government holds the press to
account for seditious reporting or violations of the Official Secrets Act.
Reporters have been arrested without charge both for sedition and for
passing on official secrets often leaked about corrupt officials.46 Typically,
several months pass, and before the matter reaches a court the reporter is
released. 47 These moves have led to self-censorship, for reporters fear
detention without charge. The Official Secrets Act prevents their publica-
tion by anyone, reporters, citizens or officials alike. And the Constitution
expressly allows prohibitions against disclosure of information received in
confidence. 48 The government recently has used economic crime charges to
imprison a reporter for a tough story, charging but never trying or proving
violation of the Act. 4 9 Reporters and editors, therefore, have to calculate
their risks of offending the government, self-censorship under the rubric
press responsibility. 50 Neither as abusive as the previous civilian govern-
ments nor as flagrant a violation of human rights as in countries where
people simply disappear, the intervention is both effective and limited.
Paradoxically, this auto-limitation increases the legitimacy of lesser
"A useful pamphlet widely circulated in non-Muslim Nigeria explains the tension between
Christian and Muslim and the basics of Sharia in the Nigerian legal system. D. Byang, Sharia
in Nigeria: A Christian Perspective (1988).
45 See May, Nigerian Military Is Reigning in One of the Freest Presses in Africa, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 30 1984, A7, col. 1; A Voice out of Africa, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1983, §6 (Magazine),
at 92, col. 2; and Newswatch, infra note 169.46 See Brooke, supra note 37; May, supra note 46; Cowell, The Free Press in Africa: Walking
a Narrow Line, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1983, at A2, col. 3; and A Voice out of Africa, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 18, 1983, §6 (Magazine), at 92, col. 2.4 7 See Brooke, supra note 37; May, supra note 46.
48 Nig. Const. of 1989, art. 38(3)(a).
49 Kraft, Unlike Rest of Africa; Press Alive and Well in Nigeria, L.A. Times, Apr. 28, 1987,
at 1, col. 1.5 0 Journalists confirmed this in private discussion with the author and also added that
no one knows how many people have been detained and then released before charges are
brought.
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interventions, for they may be less brutal than those by earlier civilian
power struggles trying to eliminate rivals.
A third, more subtle, intervention to control the courts uses economic
hardship. Despite reasonable availability to administrative officials, of
physical office space, help, court personnel and supplies simply are not ade-
quate for many judges. Also, requiring judges to retire at the age of 65, as
if they were civil servants in the ministry of justice, increases the control
over judges who may wish appointment or who might wish to continue to
sit. Ironically, junior members of the bar have opposed this attempt to
reduce the influence of experienced senior judges. One might have thought
younger lawyers would like the measure, for it would create opportunities
for upward mobility. It is seen instead as against the interests of younger
lawyers who have learned from and respect senior judges and do not wish
to appear before inexperienced and unpredictable new judges beholden to
the government. Besides, some of the best and most "liberal" judges are the
older ones well grounded in the Anglo-American common law tradition.
In contrast to the Nigerian Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court is largely insulated from political pressure by lifetime appointments
and a carefully cultivated tradition of judicial review and respect for the
American Court. The American Supreme Court also controls its own
docket so that by taking fewer cases it relieves pressure on resources that the
Nigerian courts experience. The United States Supreme Court's function
has been to exercise and to protect the judicial power. Under the supremacy
clause, this function includes supervising the lower and state courts under
the judicial power. In this constitutional structure for protecting civil and
political liberties, change occurs slowly and may recede as it did after the
Civil War and at present, with presidential apppointment of conservative
justices. Ongoing procedural struggles in litigation often shape the
substance of protection of important rights. The outcome of cases, for
example, may depend upon the Supreme Court's rather technical determi-
nations of whether it will follow or overturn a precedent, whether courts
will review a statute facially or must await a specific litigated case, whether
courts may use social science and statistics, whether burdens and standards
of proof should shift, whether a statute is invalid for overbreadth or vague-
ness, and whether time, place and manner restrictions on free expression are
permitted.
C. The Legislative Power and the Courts
The Nigerian National Assembly holds all legislative power under the 1979
Constitution and under the 1989 revision for the "peace, order and good
government of the Federation. . . . "51 Like its American counterpart, it
consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The Constitution also
51Nig. Const. of 1989, art. 4.
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allocates legislative powers of the states to their Houses of Assembly.
Neither assemblies may oust the jurisdiction of the courts save as provided
by the Constitution. The Nigerian separation of powers, as Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, quoting an opinion of Justice Jackson wrote of the
American structure, operates as a balance of each to the other, "the better
to secure liberty" .52 The American structure ensures the possibility of limits
to government through pluralism of public and private power centres:
reserved and retained public powers and private rights. In contrast, the
Nigerian Constitution itself allocates expressly all the positive guarantees of
rights and duties and the positive responsibility of government to provide
for the security and the welfare of the people.
53
Government induced by self-interest or democratic pluralism maintains
mutual checks on potential tyranny by the robust bargaining among fac-
tions. But bargaining as such does not necessarily lead to a good society.
Under the American Constitution, this bargaining is sustained by the vision
of civil society that creates intermediate institutions best ensured through
freedom of expression, belief and religion. These values have led to the cre-
ation of private associations and affected elections. Programmes within the
political branches at all levels of government especially are dominated by
private market arrangements restraining government. In addition to the
national powers sought by the two political branches, the Federal courts
enforce Federal law through the judicial power brought to bear on actual
cases or controversies, not abstract ones. It is fashionable for non-western
commentators to view the United States' tradition ideologically from the
perspective of "individualism and legalism" as anathema to ethnic, com-
munitarian and customary traditions.54 Seldom do European or other
scholars, as Toqueville did, study the extent to which American state and
local customs preserve co-operative and communitarian traditions.
It is true that Federal judges throughout the United States sit, divided
into district courts and eleven circuit courts of appeal, and the District
of Columbia and Federal circuits, applying Federal law. Where could there
be more pluralism and diversity than in the fifty autonomous state
52 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, [section VB of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion]
quoting Justice Jackson: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty,
it also contemplates that practice w-ill integrate the dispersed powers into a workable govern-
ment. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity" Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
53Nig. Const. of 1989, art. 15(2)(b) ("the security and welfare of the people shall be the
primary purpose and responsibility of government"). But compare preamble to U.S. Con-
stitution and the legislative power to provide for the common welfare. Crosskey, infra note
209.
5'See e.g., Sinha, supra note 29 at 53 (arguing that a single-catalog of a Western-oriented
approach to human rights follows from documents such as the American Declaration of
Independence, espousing one dominant ideology, one historical unit, one single economic
system, and one legal system administering rights). Sinha asserts, without empirical grounding,
that the West believes that governments and societies are the same. One would have thought
the West believes just the opposite.
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290 Gordon A. Christenson
governments also with courts in every county and with thousands of local
governments with commissions, councils and courts organised from within
to handle cases for 248 million people? Often state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over federal questions. Often overlooked are the autonomous
communities of Native Americans, governed by an extensive system of local
councils and courts, with jurisdiction over most of the country's one and a
half million native American citizens. Nearly 150 of these local courts hear
200,000 civil and criminal cases annually, using indigenous code and
custom. Indigenous local courts use different rules of evidence and pro-
cedure, although they must accord basic fairness in accordance with the
United States Constitution.
The Federal courts in addition to state courts are available to all persons
to protect the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but varying customs
and traditions control habitual life in most communities.55 State courts
may be more protective of community interests locally than are Federal
courts. Arbitration and alternative dispute resolution systems constantly
develop to meet private needs outside courts, and the Supreme Court has
specifically encouraged party choice to direct cases from the courts. Settle-
ment systems press those with disputes to settle out of court by
negotiation.
When passion and interest drive factions to abuse power through collec-
tive majorities in communities, the Federal courts must use caution in over-
turning the local legislative bargains. 56 The tradition of respect for prior
cases and the interest of preserving the judicial power from encroachment
by the political branches through the technical instruments of court review
ensures this stability and continuity in a human institution. The influence
on this process of judicial review by any one of nine Supreme Court
justices, who are appointed for life by succeeding presidents of different
political philosophy, is gradual unless the dominant majority in important
cases has been by one vote. In Nigeria, the turnover is greater, for judges
must retire at the age of 65 with full pension and benefits. And a President
has considerably more political discretion in changing a Chief Justice
through inducing voluntary retirement or removal.57
The developing constitution in Nigeria uses separation of powers to
strengthen the executive in relation to the national legislature. The military
government justifies its ouster and discipline of civilian governments from
55Wiehl, Indian Courts Struggling to Keep Their Identities, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1988, at
B7, col. 3. See also Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 Ariz. L. Rev.
225 (1989); Duro Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
1466-74 (2nd ed. 1988); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982). For an example
of the operation of religious courts in the United States, see E. Firmage and R. Mangrum. Zion
in the Courts: A Legal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1830-1900
(1988).
56See H. Nelson, supra note 16.
57 Nig. Const. of 1989, art, 229(1) (subject to confirmation by Senate); art. 275 (mandatory
retirement at age 65); art. 276 (l)(a) (removal by President with support of two-thirds majority
of the Senate).
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time to time by citing civilian corruption and election rigging. 58 Since
Nigerian independence in 1960 only two civilian governments have held
power, the most recent from 1979 to 1983. The corrupting power of factions
and the confusion in structure inherited from the British seem thus placed
under de facto guardianship of the military.
While the structure of separation of powers in the American and Nigerian
constitutions are similar formally, the underlying political cultures within
the two constitutions differ; yet, core values of freedom find deep roots in
the separate traditions of each country. Viewing community values in the
United States realistically through the eyes of the Nigerian tradition allows
us to see the profound influence of local custom and tradition in both
countries.
FORMAL CORE FREEDOMS: NEGATIVE LIBERTIES AND AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES
A. Common Origins: World War II and International Human Rights
While Eleanor Roosevelt deserves credit for much of the work leading to the
monumental United Nations effort in adopting the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, it has earlier grounding in that terrible transition from eco-
nomic depression to world war when human dignity itself stared into the
abyss. In January 1941, just as World War II was racking Europe and about
to engulf the rest of us, including Africa (indicating the unresolved break-
up of the balance of power among colonial powers and their colonies),
President Roosevelt gave his famous "four freedoms" message to Con-
gress. He used the simplest expression invoking the most precious freedoms
for all people threatened everywhere. 59 Recognising the traditions of liberty
and equality, both ancient and modern, Roosevelt invoked four basic free-
doms to form a core of human dignity binding people together powerfully
enough to triumph over the destructive forces of totalitarianism.6 °
The core freedoms, later expanded and called the second bill of rights, are
these: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom
from fear and freedom from want.61 Incorporated into the Atlantic
Charter, these common ideals captured powerful human cries. They
58 Noble, N.Y. Times, supra note 19.
59 Eighth Annual Message to Congress, Jan. 6, 1941, reprinted in 3 The State of the Union
Messages of the Presidents, 1790-1966, at 2875 (1966); Address by the President, 87 Cong.
Rec. 44, 46-47 (1941).
6 See Lauren, First Principles of Racial Equality: History and the Politics and Diplomacy
of Human Rights Provisions in the United Nations Charter, 5 Human Rights Quarterly 1, at
4-5 (1983).
6' No express mention of racial equality was included, however, in the 1941 address. See
Lauren, supra note 60, at 4. By 1944, Roosevelt called for a second bill of rights providing
expanded economic rights, "a new basis of security and prosperity . for all-regardless of
station, race, or creed". Eleventh Annual Message to Congress, Jan. 11, 1944, reprinted in 3
The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents, 1790-1966, at 2875, 2880-81 (1966). See
Sohn, supra note 14, at 32-33.
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292 Gordon A. Christenson
urgently responded to internal threats from economic depression and
external threats to democratic government and liberties.62 They helped
galvanise the Allies' collective will. After repelling the external threat, the
Great Powers joined with all other countries to extend these same principles
into a United Nations Organisation, with a purpose of human dignity
learned not only from moral philosophy but from the experience of total
war in an impending nuclear age. The Charter gave Eleanor Roosevelt and
other leaders a compelling legitimacy to craft a more detailed summary in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.63 Influencing the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, this experience
also found its way into African and especially the Nigerian constitutions.
4
The United States Constitution (with the Bill of Rights and Civil War
Amendments) had grown from similar experience, but in a different world
with problems arising from different circumstances. Roosevelt's conception
of the four freedoms symbolised a transformation in the constitutional
structure in the 20th century to cope with both internal and external threats
to human dignity and democratic government. The Puerto Rican Constitu-
tion, adopted by compact with the Congress and observed by the United
Nations, explicitly adopted many of these human rights guarantees. In
effect, the freedoms were symbols that reconciled the negative limits on
governmental power traditionally associated with the Western liberal state
with the positive essentials to human dignity and freedom that come only
from economic and social co-operation and productive activity led by a
strong central government. The first two of Roosevelt's freedoms and the
third in part negate governmental power. These represent the social
compact tradition of self-government. Found in the Bill of Rights and the
Civil War amendments, they reflect a certain anarchic streak embodied in
the libertarian tradition constraining government action. They say nothing
about positive rights or duties of citizens or of governments, leaving these
rights and duties for autonomous individuals driven by self-interest and
personal fulfillment (possibly with limited altruism) to work out privately or
through representatives in the legislative process.65 The final freedom,
62 The Atlantic Charter also promoted self-determination, for Churchill the victims of Nazi
rule, and for Roosevelt the colonial peoples. See Louis and Robinson, The U.S. and the End
of British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941-1951 in the Transfer of Power in Africa: Decoloni-
zation 1940-1960, at 27-55 (W. Louis and P. Gifford, eds. 1982).
63 See J. Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure 31-77
(1984) for a personal memory of the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
beginning with his own Secretariat draft that drew upon many drafts from countries and
organisations, including one from the influential American Law Institute. Professor Sohn
refers to a 1942 United States draft international bill of rights that included similar provisions.
Sohn, supra note 60, at 35. See Lauren, supra note 60, at 7 for documentation of the drafting
process inside the Department of State.
64 Lester, supra note 14, at 541. They also found their way into the United States through,
for example, direct influence in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
65See Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 864 (1986)
(purpose of constitution to protect citizens from oppressive government not to secure from
government affirmative services or entitlements).
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freedom from want, and to some extent the third, freedom from fear,
reflect a modern version of the nurturing, interdependent side of the state
beginning in the Western tradition with the notion of a good society from
Plato and Aristotle and in other traditions with the notion of the benevolent
king or chieftain. Such a society prefers collective responsibility or co-
operative activity by leaders and citizens with a modicum of civic virtue in
the polity or ultimate responsibility for the community's well-being in the
ruler. While it is fashionable to claim that human rights in the Universal
Declaration and the United Nations Charter speak from a Western
tradition, at the time Roosevelt addressed them he took a decidedly anti-
colonialist stance 66 much revered in Nigeria before socialist and Marxist
thought became predominant for a time. Most of the continent of Africa
had been under colonial rule at the time of the "Four Freedoms" speech,
and the impact of the international human rights experience, much of which
began in the American experience, should not be discounted despite Afro-
centric criticism of Western attitudes, as Professor Lillich has reminded us
recently and Reid earlier.67
B. Different Structures and Philosophy
The constitutions of the United States and Nigeria differ in approaching
positive and negative freedoms. In the United States, the remarkable power
to strike down government action when confronted with one of the negative
rights (or limitations upon power) rests with the Supreme Court and the
inferior federal courts, widely respected as guardians of constitutional
liberties. This negative restraint upon governmental power contrasts with
the Nigerian enumeration of both positive rights and duties for citizens as
well as allocating power, subject to express limitations upon both power
and rights. In interpreting these more extensive rights and duties, the
Nigerian courts have less certainty about their judicial review power. The
enumeration of rights and duties in both the 1979 and 1989 Nigerian
Constitutions sets out a more explicit (though not necessarily a more effec-
tive) political, economic and social philosophy of the relationship between
individuals, groups, communities, and governments. And while the lengthy
constitutional documents on 1979 and 1989 seem to combine the best in
American, European and Third World political thought, African ethnic and
customary arrangements form a powerful interpretive community for build-
ing governmental structures, under a strong executive. Former President
Obasanjo explains this difference:
"If our system and structure have to evolve like those of most settled
industrial societies, it would take time but it must be our own, designed
by ourselves for ourselves. . . .We opted for executive presidential
66 See S. Unger, supra note 9, at 44.67Lillich, supra note 1 at 59-61.
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294 Gordon A. Christenson
system because our first constitution modelled on the British parliamen-
tary system led to confusion and conflict at the critical time between the
president who reigned and the prime minister who ruled; the Nigerian
culture by and large admits only of the chief or the king who reigns and
rules. The multi-national dimension of our society made a federal system
of government imperative with nineteen states, where no state can hold
the whole nation to ransom either because of its size, resources or strate-
gic importance.",
6 8
Himself preferring a one-party political structure (with a clearly
delineated role for the military) representing all the people both geo-
graphically and sectorially, Obasanjo insists also upon human rights and
respects for human dignity. The sum total of constitutional rights and
duties need to be spelled out between ruler and ruled. Gross abuses by
government need to stop, but "citizens also have to be made to understand
that there are sacred obligations, duties and responsibilities which they have
to perform towards the corporate existence of their countries, the welfare of
all and their own individual well-being" .69 Freedom of expression must be
preserved but without detriment to the existence of the state. In effect, the
strong executive acts as a guardian in determining this balance favouring
national unity, much more effectively than do the courts. 70 In the recent
military government the courts have been functioning, as explained above,
although under emergency decree of that government.
In contrast to expectations both of positive entitlements and of duties of
citizens in Nigeria and of the government, the American structure
symbolises the underlying political theory of the negative "liberal" or
limited state. The theory and practice negate total constitutional power in
the positive state. Thus, no duties emanate to citizens from the constitution.
While allowing maximum freedom in private individuals and groups to
conduct transactions among themselves, Congress and the states have the
political power and responsibility to provide for the public welfare by law
in positive ways, creating rights and duties. One can find in the American
Constitution no written affirmative human rights guarantees flowing from
government to individuals (other than the pre-ambular provision to insure
justice and provide for the general welfare) nor is any positive duty placed
upon any or all the three branches to provide human services of the same
kind provided in detail in the Nigerian Constitution and its schedules.71
68 Obasanjo, supra note 5, at 5.
69 Id. at 6.
70Under Obasanjo's military rule the federal central agrarian elites became national agen-
cies. Later, Babangida continued the centralisation by professionalising and rationalising the
civilian bureaucratic elite. Ola, A Profile of the Higher Public Servant in the Nigerian Govern-
ment, 123 Int'l Soc. Sci. J. 49 (1990).
71 A most recent judicial recognition of this political theory is articulated explicitly by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in the case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989) holding
that the Constitution does not place an affirmative obligation upon state and local govern-
ments to protect their citizens against harm from private individuals. The failure of a county
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Even the Commerce Clause, Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause work negatively
in this sense by tying legislative outsiders and minorities to legislative
majorities in preventing legislative classifications that unfairly discriminate
in creating affirmative rights and duties.72
The American founders' skepticism toward any governmental power
controlled by faction, especially that of a temporary majority, or by an
absolute monarch explains the difference between the two constitutions.
Through saying what the state cannot do, as well as conferring only those
powers expressly delegated to separated branches of government, the
founders tried to reflect a retained right in the people to guard against the
tendencies of government to accumulate total power. Skeptical about
whether those in power would respect the reserved domain, Madison drew
from Montesquieu and Hume diffusion techniques to assure the control of
factions through limits and checks, the division and separation of powers,
pitting ambition against ambition.73
Nonetheless, human rights both of the negative constitutional type, such
as those listed in the Bill of Rights, and of the affirmative social and
economic legislative kind have evolved over time in the United States.74
Some reflect the fierce liberty of pre-Revolutionary colonists as well as
pioneers who in the last century crossed the American continent to the
Rocky Mountains and beyond and made the desert and prairies blossom.
Part of the reason lay in the colonies' previous experiences, often forgotten.
For 160 years before the American Revolution, Pilgrims and explorers and
those seeking adventure or a new life populated the colonies under charters
from the crowns of England and of other countries. Life in the colonies was
religious, quarrelsome and anarchic.75 With distance from Europe and with
their own unique experiences with the native population and each other
through various charters, privileges and immunities and rights of
social services agancy in Wisconsin to protect a boy from an abusive father even after notice
of abuse did not violate the boy's rights under the 14th amendment not to be deprived by the
state of life or liberty without due process of law. Chief Justice Rehnquist writes that the
purpose of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "was to protect the people
from the State, not to insure that the State protected them from each other". Id. at 1003. The
states have no affirmative constitutional duty to act in these circumstances. While the states are
free to enact positive laws imposing liability upon welfare officials or other officials for failure
of duty, "they should not have it thrust upon them by this Court's expansion of the Due
Process Clause". Id. at 1007.
72 See J. Ely, Democracy and Dissent: A Theory of Judicial Review 80-88 (1980).
7'2d. 80, 93.
74 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 imposed an affirmative duty to maintain religion and
morality. Both state and federal governments have made legislative provision for affirmative
duties such as the Medicare, Medicaid, the Food Stamp programs. Some state courts have
held, based on state constitutions, that their states have affirmative duties. See e.g., Rose v.
Council for Better Education, No. 88-SC-804-TG, slip op. (Ky. Sept. 28, 1989); Edgewood
Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (Kentucky and Texas courts, respec-
tively, holding that the state constitutions imposed an affirmative duty on the state govern-
ments to create and support free public schools).750. Handlin & L. Handlin, Liberty and Power: 1600-1760 (1986).
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Englishmen through the ancient constitution, the human communities in
the new world were already accustomed to greater diversity and freedom
than Europeans with their collective memories of recent feudal relationships
of protection, allegiance and service.76
We may contrast this American structure, a unique product of the
Enlightenment anti-authority philosophy of human reason and social
contract with the Nigerian Constitution of 1989, claimed by some to be a
direct descendant of the post-four-freedoms era combined with the strong
leader's social benevolence. As described above, the Nigerian Constitution
is a comprehensive positive charter of relationships, duties, entitlements
and powers both of governments of all kinds and of citizens. The distinctive
European colonial tradition that influenced this constitution (generally
letting local administration govern subject to colonial decree, unless
contrary to natural justice) came to embrace the new international human
rights tradition of a positive constitutional structure providing affirmative
rights and duties, in effect a compact between a new government and
citizens. While espousing separation and division of powers structurally
similar to the American Constitution, the Nigerian Constitution is organic
and relational. It provides a detailed, almost code-like enumeration of
powers, 77 principles of state policy,78 citizenship rules, 79 affirmative
fundamental rights, 80 negative limitations to protect civil liberties, 81 and
directives to the state for enumerated political, economic, social, eductional
and cultural objectives.82 Affirmative duties are placed not only upon the
state to guarantee these human rights, but upon every person as well. All
persons have the constitutional duty to accord human rights to others.
83
76Yet, as Professor John Phillip Reid reveals, the rights, privileges and immunities of
Englishmen as against government under their ancient constitution and preserved in colonial
charters were invoked as grievances against the more radical British movement toward
parliamentary supremacy (as urged by Bentham and Austin) over internal legislation, taxation
and representation of the colonies. J. Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolu-
tion: The Authority of Rights 211-237 (1986).
77Nig. Const. of 1989, arts. 4-13.78 Nig. Const. of 1989, arts. 14-24 (obligations of government, policy objectives, cultural
policy, obligations of the mass media, national ethic and duties of the citizen).79 Nig. Const. of 1989, arts. 25-31.
8°Nig. Const. of 1989, arts. 25-31 (Fundamental Rights). Patterned after human rights
covenants and the 1979 constitution, these articles use language of positive right or entitlement:
"Every person has a right to life" (art. 32; identical to old art. 30); "Every individual is enti-
tled to respect for the dignity of his person" (art. 33(1); identical to old art. 31(1)); "Every
person shall be entitled to his personal liberty" (art. 34(1); identical to old art. 32(1)); "The
privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic
communications is hereby guaranteed and protected" (art. 36); "Every person shall be entitled
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion" (art. 37(1)); "Every person shall be entitled
to freedom of expression" (art 38(1)); "Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and
associate with other persons" (art 39).8 Id., arts. 30, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, and 42 (special jurisdiction for redress before High Court).
82 Id., Chapter II (Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy), arts.
14-22.
83 Article 1(1) states: "This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding
force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria". Id.
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Rejected is the political tradition of a negative liberal state that presumes pre-
existing liberty expressed in common law and natural law for civil society.
C. Constitutional Differences and International Human Rights
The Nigerian Constitution is thought to reflect the profound influence of
the human rights instruments emanating from the United Nations and
regional charters as especially influenced in turn by the American, French
and Russian revolutions. These instruments express the best normative
aspirations of both the libertarian and the positive social good models that
the international community can draw upon. It is revealing to note,
however, that neither Nigeria nor the United States has made formal
commitment to the most important of the human rights conventions.
At least four human rights treaties signed and submitted by President Jimmy
Carter in 1978 are still before the Senate today. They are: the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the American Convention on
Human Rights.8 4 The United States, too, has signed but not yet ratified the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Nigeria has taken no action with regard
to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or with regard to
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Nigeria has signed and ratified the
convention on discrimination against women and has acceded to, but not
signed, the convention against racial discrimination. 5 Nigeria has signed but
not ratified the convention against torture.8 6 In addition, it has ratified the
8 Message of the President Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S.
Exec. Doc. No. 95-C. D. E. & F., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
"' Although Nigeria has ratified the convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, the much criticised practice of female circumcision still persists in its most
severe form, excision of the clitoris and partial sewing together of the sides of the vulva, in
Nigeria. Perlez, Puberty Rites for Girls Is Bitter Issue in Africa, N.Y. Times Int'l, Jan. 15,
1990, at 4, col. 3. Two articles of the convention appear particularly apropos with regard to
this practice. Art. 2(f) obligates the signitory states "[t]o take all appropriate measures, includ-
ing legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women". Art. 5(a) requires the state "[t]o modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination
of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferi-
ority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women" The
African Charter, art. 18(3), also imposes an obligation on the states to "ensure the elimination
of every discrimination against women". The circumcision practice is founded on the notion
that women should be virgins at marriage and that sexual pleasure is the sole prerogative of
men. Many women believe that circumcision is necessary to be accepted by other women and
in order to marry. Perlez, N.Y. Times, supra. For a thorough discussion of the practice of
female circumcision in various countries, see Slack, Female Circumcision, 10 Hum. Rts. Q.
347 (1988).
86 United Nations, Multiliteral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31
December 1988 (1989). For a list of human rights treaties the U.S. has ratified, see Strossen,
Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal
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298 Gordon A. Christenson
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Just recently the United
States ratified and implemented the Genocide Convention. 87 Nigeria has
not yet ratified it.
Formally, the claim that these human rights instruments reflect language
similarity and universal values whether in African constitutions or in Western
traditions may have appeal. In cultural context, however, nothing could be
further from the truth. The Nigerian structure of separation and division of
powers, deceptively similar to that of the United States, rests upon an entirely
different political attitude towards government. As Obasanjo explained
above, the constitutional benevolent ruler and traditional commercial custom
mean government in Nigeria, while in the United States the liberal or contrac-
tarian tradition of legislative bargaining under negative limitations of rights
forms the idea of legislation and government, with suspicion of benevolence.
The idea of obligation, which the law imposes on the state to furnish positive
guarantees of basic human need and fulfillment, flows in Nigeria as a distinct
social fact, more similar to a European tradition. 8 It is not much an American
notion. The African view of law as consisting of ethnic and customary
Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 Hastings L. J. 805, 811 n. 21 (1990). For a list
of human rights instruments to which the U.S. is not a party, see id. at 812 n. 26. See also,
International Human Rights Instruments: A Compilation of Treaties, Agreements and Decla-
rations of Interest to the United States (R. Lillich ed. 1986, looseleaf updated annually).
87 An event long overdue occurred when President Reagan signed into law a very weak bill
barely implementing ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide nearly 40 years after the United Nations General Assembly approved
it on December 9, 1948. President Signs Bill Ratifying U.N. Accord Against Genocide, New
York Times, 5 Nov. 1988, Nat' 1 Ed. at 3, col. 1. While President Harry Truman had submitted
it to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification, the Convention languished
in the Senate for many years. Ninety-seven other countries ratified it in the meantime. Consent
by the Senate finally came February 19, 1986, subject to conforming legislation. Congress
passed the enabling legislation in October, 1988, and the President approved it saying, "I am
delighted to fulfill the promise made by Harry Truman to all peoples of the world..." Id. The
new law defines genocide narrowly, claiming consistency with the Convention, as acting with
a "specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial or reli-
gious group". Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1988, H. R. 4243, S. 1851, 100th
Cong (1988). One might just as easily conclude that the narrow definition of specific intent "in
substantial part" (in contrast with the treaty language "in part") undermines the general
purpose of the Convention to prevent creeping genocide by hidden and marginal attacks
against the ideological front guard of a noxious racial or national minority thereby weakening
its solidarity. For a highly critical review, see Paust, Congress and Genocide: They're not
Going to Get Away with it, 11 Mich. J. Int'l Law 90 (1989). Nigeria has not yet ratified the
Genocide Convention.
88 Jorgensen, Philosophy of Life and Ideology (Who are We?), 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev 989
(1988) [recent Festschrift honoring Edgar Bodenheimer's contributions to jurisprudence]:
"Edgar Bodenheimer represents the European cultural tradition, which since the days of
Aristotle has regarded law as a tool for forming 'the good society' and not only a political
device for 'suppression' (Marx) or for maximising 'public utility' (Bentham) .... The idea is
that justice is a living, material conception which changes and adapts itself to the changing
social conditions, but which retains a general structure based on the humn needs for freedom
and security, reflecting the biological nature of being an individual and a social being". Citing
Bodenheimer, Individual and Organised Society from the Perspective of a Philosophical
Anthropology, in J. Soc. Biol. Struct. 207-26 (1986). But see Sinha, The Anthropocentic
Theory of International Law as a Basis for Human Rights, 10 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 469
(1978).
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community relationships, 89 contrasts sharply with the Marxist view of law as
repression, with Bentham's notion of law as incorporating utility or with
Nietzche's view of law as the rule of the weak to curb the will of the superior
few. 90 Beyond that, the African chieftain has responsibilities for his village or
community. Edgar Bodenheimer, after a lifetime of scholarship bridging all
cultures, concluded that all societies that claim a legal system provide through
law for the prominent values of liberty, security and equality, although their
relative rank may vary. All these legal systems nevertheless subordinate
their values to certain overriding considerations of the public good.91
Any positive constitutional guarantees, for example the right to employ-
ment or to a fair share of food, housing, income or wealth, necessarily
entails greater power in the central government to enforce control over the
co-operative activities of production and redistribution in order to assure
the guarantees. In the Nigerian Constitution the various guarantees of well-
being thus place an affirmative duty upon the state and federal governments
to allocate resources to provide services for the people as well as to protect
them and their consensual transactions. In the American Constitution, the
allocation of power to provide for human services and entitlements is
divided between the Congress and the states. These powers are exercised
within the representative democratic processes, under one of the expressly
delegated powers such as over commerce, or under the retained police
power of the states. Since negative constitutional limitations found in a
typical Bill of Rights have never been considered adequate to provide for
the general well-being, the American constitutional structure anticipates a
continuing response by the political branches and states interacting with the
civil society that includes commerce. A constitutional duty upon the
national government to provide basic human needs or entitlements does not
easily yield to enforcement by the courts. The American judiciary may
interpret limits to the legislative power to provide for basic needs, but may
not itself create judge-directed government services, however desirable they
may be, according to classic liberal theory. 92 In the Nigerian system
89 Motala, Human Rights in Africa: A Cultural Ideological, and Legal Examination, 12
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 373 (1989) (contrasting and comparing the different human
rights perspectives in the African Charter with the Western ideological values in most of the
other human rights instruments). See also Human Rights in Africa, supra note 1.
90 Id. See Sinha, supra note 30 (arguing that most human rights instruments reflect Western
values of individualism and legalism insensitive to other value systems including African).
91 Bodenheimer, Preface to the Chinese Edition of Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and
Method of the Law, reprinted in 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev 973, 974 (1988).
92 At least that is the prevailing political theory of the American liberal state in simple form.
Scholars and realists often study the underlying structure of power and criticise or deconstruct
the myth system of the liberal state and try to locate where power hides and operates; restoring
republican virtue frequently becomes the ideal; but the foundations of the liberal state as
described seem well-understood even as criticised. But note the recent Supreme Court decision
permitting use of the judicial power to order a remedy of desegregating public schools requir-
ing a municipal tax prevented by State law. Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S.Ct. 1651 (1990). Nega-
tive libertarian conceptions of freedom, in the view of many American scholars, lead to absurd
results. See, for example, 1. Shapiro, The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory 288-97 (1986).
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300 Gordon A. Christenson
guidance to all branches of government emanates from an organic and com-
prehensive statement of policies, directions and expectations.
The judiciary in both liberal and positive states encounters theoretical
and practical difficulty most often in protecting basic human rights. While
a contemporary judiciary often develops judicial and constitutional policy
through reasoning in particular cases, as an institution it lacks the instru-
ments of political will and expertise needed to shape and sustain social
policy in a complex democracy. Even assuming the legitimacy of its own
political will, moreover, a court encounters grave practical difficulty when
it requires the government to spend public money or appropriate it for
a particular social service responding to a need.93 Court orders requiring
decisions allocating resources against the will of a popular majority that
controls the taxing and spending authority confront democratic govern-
ment directly. At most a court in a liberal democratic state can dismiss
cases brought to enforce laws it thinks invalid (sedition charges, unlawful
detention, or unlawful discrimination, for example) or hold officials in
contempt in unusual cases of unconstitutional patterns of behaviour such
as intentional racial desegregation in public schools, prison conditions
amounting to cruel and unusual punishment, or failure of duty under law
to clean up environmental pollution caused by the government's own
neglect. 94 Even when it restructures an illegal practice by consent orders
in institutional discrimination actions or conspiracies, a court must rely
upon the expertise and political will of the parties (the government is
nearly always a party) to initiate and agree. For all of these reasons,
among others, most constitutions leave the implementation of programs
to achieve positive entitlements to the elected political branches of govern-
ment, either explicitly or by restraint.
Many programmes at all levels in the United States have been enacted
into laws for economic and social welfare. The fact that they are not
expressed in the Constitution in the same positive terms as in the Nigerian
Constitution means merely that their desirability and implementation must
be negotiated in legislative bargaining. Even when guided by affirmative
language in constitutions such as Nigeria's the executive and the parliamen-
tary assembly need to exercise political will not usually sustained over time
by courts. The courts in Nigeria assume even less of a positive remedial
function, despite the constitution's all-encompassing policies, than do
courts in the United States.
93 Several cases in which lower federal courts have ordered programmatic changes generally
involving a federal remedy for constitutional abuse requiring appropriations under penalty
of contempt may now go forward under Justice White's narrow opinion in Missouri v.
Jenkins and in Spallone v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 625 (1990), cases that challenged the
encroachment of judicial power to order compliance with a court-imposed remedy for con-
stitutional abuse.
"Missouri v. Jenkins (school desegregation); Tillery v. Owens, 719 F. Supp. 1256 (W. D.
Pa. 1989) (Prison conditions); Ohio v. United States Department of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760
(S. D. Ohio 1989) (environmental pollution).
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COMPARING SPECIAL MEASURES TO OVERCOME DISCRIMINATION
Especially troubling has been legal and de facto segregation of the races,
dating from the end of slavery and the slave trade, as well as cultural
attitudes of superiority of one race over another. Roosevelt in fact avoided
explicit reference to racial equality in his "Four Freedoms" speech. Not
until a year later, in 1942 after persuading Churchill to drop his objections,
did Roosevelt face the issue and call for equality in the process of decoloni-
sation and rebuilding after World War II.95 This major shift prepared the
way for recognising first in the United Nations Charter, later in
international instruments and then in new constitutions for new nations that
race-based discrimination could not be maintained either by official policy
or by ignoring past societal practices. 96
In attempting to rectify this history of past race discrimination, many
institutions and governments have used "affirmative action" programmes
or special preferences to ensure not only equal opportunity for minority
participation, in addition to desegregation, but also to try to rectify this
history in the future given the received societal preferences favouring the
dominant established interests. The idea found expression in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Later the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination specifically obligated the
parties to undertake policies to eliminate racial discrimination, including
"special measures" to protect and develop certain racial groups. An excep-
tion to principles of equality, the special measures of favoured treatment
would make up for past discrimination so long as "unequal or separate
rights for different racial groups" are not maintained after the objectives of
95 Supra note 61, at 2881; Address to Congress, reprinted in 11 Hum. Rts. Q. 173 (1989).
Churchill was particularly concerned with colonial policies and with the undertones of racial
superiority in the war then being fought. Supra note 60.
96 In the United States the history of racial discrimination is intimately connected with the
history of slavery. Winthrop Jordan, in White over Black: American Attitudes Towards the
Negro, 1550-1812 (1968) provides a detailed examination of this association. Europeans began
the slave trade in America in collusion with powerful African tribes. M. Crowder and G.
Abdullahi, Nigeria: An Introduction to Its History 58-59 (1979). While few slaves lived in the
Northern colonies, in the Southern colonies slavery became an integral part of social and eco-
nomic life. In his book, In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process (1978),
Federal judge Leon Higginbotham has studied the early beginnings of slavery in America. He
found that in the colonies chattel slavery did not exist at common law. See also E. Cover,
Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (1975). The institution of slavery was
introduced first in America through change in the instrument of indentured service. Higgin-
botham at 32-35. All indentured servants at common law were bound by contract to service for
a usual period of years of apprenticeship, then released as free tradesmen. Id. at 155-56.
Fearing an uprising of all indentured servants, the plantation owners and overseers turned
indentured white against indentured black, influencing the courts to recognise full chattel
ownership of Africans but not of Europeans. For a description of this process in Virginia, see
id. at 50-55 and E. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial
Virginia 328-37 (1975). In ancient times and even until the slave trade, slavery was never based
entirely upon race. D. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture 49-50 (1966). In
Nigeria, the slaves that fed the slave trade were captives in tribal wars, prisoners or others of
the same race. Crowder and Abdullahi, supra at 58-59.
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full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms have
been achieved. 97
A. Special Preferences in United States
Commitments to social justice in the United States beyond formal equal
opportunity by special measures of "afirmative action" have led in turn to
charges of "reverse discrimination," or unfair preferences accorded min-
orities over members of the majority in affirmative policies based upon
quotas, goals or preferences to overcome past discrimination but prospec-
tively not compensatorily. 98 The judiciary in this situation in the United
States has assumed a special role to review these types of programmes.
First, for a time, the Supreme Court favourably interpreted state-sponsored
preferences along the lines of the human rights conventions, although they
never were invoked. 99 Recently, the Court has started to reduce or, in
effect, to terminate the prospective impact of these special preferences (with
Congress reacting to reassert some of them). Second, the Court has dis-
tinguished between intentional and merely benign discrimination. Govern-
ment or courts may rectify past intentional discrimination by remedial
97 Art. 2(2), International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature by G. A. Res. 2106 A (XX), Dec. 21, 1965; entry into force Jan. 4,
1969; U.S. signed, Sept. 28, 1966, submitted to U.S. Senate Feb. 23, 1978.
98 These provisions justifying preferential treatment until the condition has been repaired
follow the same moral consideration as in assisting trust territories or in the old system of
Mandates of the League of Nations to bring former colonial nations into full nationhood. Id.
The difficulty in this special justice is in the terminating process. Who decides to withdraw
special measures once granted, to comply with the principle of no maintenance of unequal or
separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives have been met? How is this pro-
vision implemented to avoid further and future dependencies and the resulting political retalia-
tion upon termination? In the United States, that decision function recently has been assumed
by the Supreme Court, using the underlying theory of individual justice in a race-neutral
setting driven by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court terminates any special
justice based on racial quotas not meeting the very rigorous standard of strict scrutiny of race-
based classifications (albeit minority) on the theory that justice is colour-blind and individuals
of all races are protected equally under the Amendment. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Company, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (Richmond's official 3007o minority set-aside for all city con-
struction contracts violated the equal protection clause as being race-based classification not
meeting the higher standard of scrutiny). See also, Wards Cove Packing Company, Inc. v.
Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989) (shifting the burden of proving discrimination as a result of dis-
parate impact to plaintiffs, undercutting the earlier burden placed upon defendants after a
facial showing of disparate impact to prove that discriminatory effects were directly related to
defendant's business needs); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.Ct. 2180 (1989) (allowing a challenge to
consent order by white firefighters alleging discrimination).
99 As Professor Lockwood points out, however, the argument against racial discrimination
from the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, among other principles, was made very strongly in various briefs filled with
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education. While the opinion did not use any of these
arguments, for the public mood in the McCarthy era was not kindly to the United Nations,
they might have been very influential considering the embarrassment of domestic injustice to
international leadership of the strongest democracy of the time. Lockwood, The United
Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 901
(1984).
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measures such as race-based quotas. The Supreme Court, however, now
requires stricter showing of a compelling interest in programmes to
eliminate the effects of past societal discrimination when the impact of
goals or quotas unreasonably affect other individuals not found to be
culpable of intentional discrimination. Burdening one innocent person to
provide special preferences to another on the basis of race, as the Court
frames the question, has been exploited politically, enflaming a backlash
against minorities most needing help. Third, the Court gives greater
deference to racial preferences enacted by the Congress than by state or
local government. 100 The model of the negative liberal state with protection
for individual liberties and rewarding merit equally has been turned to
protect a few individuals in the racial majority from being unreasonably
burdened for measures that are the duty of all without a showing of inten-
tional discrimination. 0' l
B. Special Preferences in Nigeria
While drawing upon the human rights conventions, the Nigerian Constitu-
tion of 1989, makes no explicit reference to special measures regarding past
discrimination. The government, however, imposed quotas in 1978 to
ensure that schools and government agencies reflected the "federal charac-
ter" of Nigeria. Five percent of certain levels of jobs in the civil service and
in government-owned corporations are set aside for applicants from each of
Nigeria's states. Similarly, the cut-off point for the admissions test to
government-financed college, preparatory schools are established by the
500th-ranking student in each state. 0 2 Article 217 of the 1989 Constitution
provides that the armed forces also reflect the "federal character" of
Nigeria. Even the membership of the Supreme Court is expected to reflect
to some extent the religious and ethnic diversity of Nigeria.
0 3
The reserved places are intended to reduce ethnic conflict.1°4 These
preferential policies specifically are designed to allow the Hausa-Fulani of
northern Nigeria greater access to jobs and government positions. This
ethnic group resented the dominance of the Ibos who were better educated,
'O°Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C. et al. 110 5, Ct. 2997 (1990) (case no. 89-453).
101 See e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (invalidating an
attempt by a local school board to maintain a racially integrated faculty, at a time when the
school board had to reduce the number of faculty members that it employed, by laying off
white teachers before laying off black teachers with less seniority) and City of Richmond,
supra note ????.
102 Brooke, Ethnic Quota for Nigerians Is Challenged, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1988, §1 at 19,
col. 1. The quotas apply to only the lower ten grades of the seventeen-grade system in the civil
service. Kotch, Nigeria's Legendary Permsecs Make Way for New Order, Reuter Library
Report, Apr. 6, 1988.
13 1. Okafor, Uncertainty of Law: A Review of Appellate System of Justice in Nigeria,
Second Anambra State Law Conference, 1988, Enugu, Nigeria, 7-9 Dec. 1988.
' See Diamond, Social Change and Political Conflict in Nigeria's Second Republic in The
Political Economy of Nigeria 72-75 (I. Zartman ed. 1983) and Diamond, Nigeria in Search of
Democracy, Foreign Affairs 905, 920-21 (1984).
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reportedly because the British concentrated schools in southern Nigeria,
which they controlled directly. Fewer schools existed in northern Nigeria
which the British ruled indirectly through the Muslim emirs.
The preferential policies have at times led to ethnic conflict and charges
of reverse discrimination. 10 5 An indirect recognition of the ethnic conflict
and former dominance of the Ibo in both the private and public sectors is
Article 144(3) which requires the President to appoint at least one minister
from each state and requires that the minister be a native of that state.
Article 15(3) specifies, further, that "there shall be no predominance of
persons from a few States or from a few ethnic ... groups" in the federal
government or its agencies.10 6 The Constitution forbids discrimination
among Nigerian citizens on the basis of race, sex, religion, circumstances of
birth, place of origin, ethnic group, different communities or political
opinion, a potential challenge to preferential policies were judicial review
available as it is in the United States.
107
SEDITION AND FREE EXPRESSION
A. Common Values in Constitutions and International Instruments
Nothing better reveals the core of agreement and disagreement with
fundamental values than how the Nigerian Constitution of 1989 and
the American Constitution each treats sedition and free expression,
as compared with the guarantees provided in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Four central values with varying weights undergird freedom of
105 T. Sowell, Preferential Policies: An International Perspective 69-76 (1990); Kotch, supra
note 103; Harden, Two Decades Later, Biafra Remains Lonely Precedent, Washington Post,
June 27, 1988, at Al. Biafra was the Ibo region of Nigeria that attempted to establish inde-
pendence when a predominantly northern Moslem group of officers staged a countercoup after
an Ibo-dominated military group announced a policy of establishing national norms for all
civil service applicants at the state and federal level. Over one million people died in the result-
ing civil war. Id. A recent court case may help blur the ethnic distinctions and promote national
integration. The Nigerian Supreme Court, contrary to prevailing legal tradition, held that a
person could change his ethnic identity. The case involved a dispute over which customary law
should be applied when a Yoruba man who had lived for many years in Benin died intestate.
See Sagay, The Dawn of Legal Acculturation in Nigeria-A Significant Development in Law
and National Integration: Olowu v. Olowu, 30 J. Afr. L. 179 (1986).
10 6 For a discussion of the constitutional and statutory attempts to structure ethnic conflict
in Nigeria, see Jinadu, Federalism, the Constitutional State, and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, 15
Publius 71 (Spring 1985). Article 15(4) states: "The composition of the Government of a State,
a Local Government or any of the agencies of such Governments, and the conduct of the
affairs of the Government or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognise
the diversity of people within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging
and loyalty among all the people of the Federation".10 7Nig. Const. of 1989, art. 41. In the United States, Congress has greater power to
implement preferential policies to rectify past discrimination in cases of set-asides in govern-
ment contracts and in licenses for radio or television stations than the states whose preferential
racial policies are strictly scrutinized. See Fullilove case and the recent FTC licensing case,
supra note 100.
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expression as a political ideal in these instruments: (1) protection of politi-
cal participation in the democratic process through debate and discussion;
(2) the search for political and other truth through robust discourse in
ideas; (3) personal or group fulfillment and autonomy through individual
and group expression; and (4) preparation for adjustment or resistance
to change, including expression of pent-up anger. These values, especially
the last one, are socially useful in all states, as Mr. Gorbachev's
encouragement of freer expression in the Soviet Union reveals and
national control of expression in China, Rumania, Albania, Cuba and
other countries confirms.
The Nigerian Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression
by affirmative grant.1° s These guarantees, limited by provisions similar
to those found in human rights conventions, allow the government to over-
ride free expression when the national interest requires, by law compatible
with democratic society. They further allow the government to control
radio and television broadcasting.10 9 Article 38 of the Constitution is
similar to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
reads:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless
of frontiers.
Also expressed as Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, this freedom yields to other overriding limitations in the
Covenant. These limitations must be provided by law and must be necessary
to respect the rights or reputations of others or to protect the national secu-
rity, public order or public health or morals. Article 20 of the Covenant
prohibits "advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence." The International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination would
extend this limitation to ideas inciting racial hatred or theories of racial or
l0 Nig. Const. of 1989, art. 38: "(1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression
including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without
interference." Limitations to this right include laws reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society and the creation of government monopoly over radio and television broadcasting. It
should be noted that many government officials in Nigeria do not believe that the press should
fulfill a watchdog role even though Article 17 in Chapter 2 (Fundamental Objectives) states:
"The press, radio, television and other agencies of the mass media shall at all times be free to
uphold the fundamental objectives contained in this Chapter and highlight the responsibility
and accountability of the Government to the people". Instead, they believe the press should
co-operate with the government and help the government achieve its goals. The federal
Minister of Information indicated in 1984 that the Nigerian newspapers have a duty to ensure
peace, unity, progress and stability. The idea of developmental journalism is not unusual in the
Third World and contrasts with the West's view of the role of the press. Seng and Hunt, The
Press and Politics in Nigeria: A Case Study of Developmental Journalism, 6 B.C. Third World
L. J. 85 (1986).
'09 Nig. Const. of 1989, art. 38.
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ethnic superiority and require positive measures of elimination of such
ideas, whether official or not." 0
The African Charter on Peoples' and Human Rights provides less
protection for individual expression, requiring the "right to express and
disseminate" opinions as well as the right to free association to be within
the law. Favouring solidarity and the collective good, the African Charter
places less importance on the values of individual expression and the politi-
cal marketplace of ideas and more on those of the community."'
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution contrasts sharply
with the language of the Nigerian Constitution and the human rights instru-
ments because it is cast in a negative prohibition that appears absolute (but
is not):
Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
B. Difference in Meaning and Protection
When compared, these various ways of shaping freedom of expression
plainly show differences in political assumptions about the constitutional
state and the control of criticism of the government or of expression of
racial hatred. Seditious libel means criticism of the government to
undermine its authority or reputation, with the tendency to breach the
peace through contentiousness and rebellion. That kind of speech is now
protected as speech relating to core values of the first and second kinds
above in both constitutions. All speech, however, has limits; and therein
lies the role of the courts in each country in deciding whether government
has sufficient justification in imposing limits to criticisms against
government.
110International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Article 4: Condemning ideas of racial superiority or hatred and discrimination in any form, the
Convention obligates the Parties "to undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures
designed to eradicate all incitement to, or act of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due
regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights
expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia" to take three actions:
1. All dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, in addition to the incite-
ment to racial discrimination or violence against racial or ethnic groups shall be made punisha-
ble by law.
2. Organisations and propaganda activities that promote and incite racial discrimination,
including participation in such organisations or activities, shall be made illegal and punishable
by law.
3. Public authorities of national or local public institutions shall not be permitted to
promote or incite racial discrimination.
11 African Charter of Peoples' and Human Rights, Articles 9, 10 & 11. For a discussion of
the methods used by governments in sub-Sahara Africa to control the press, see Wilcox, Black
African States in Press Control Around the World (J. Curry and J. Dassin eds. 1982).
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1. Difference in Received Traditions
At the time of the American Revolution in 1776, the common law of free
speech only protected against prior restraint or censorship. 112 Thus the right
to free speech did not protect seditious libel or harms from private libel.
Blackstone's commentaries reflected the tradition received in the colonies
from England:
[T]he liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published .... [I]f
[a person] publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must
take the consequences of his own temerity .... [T]o punish (as the law
does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when pub-
lished, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious ten-
dency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, a
government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty."
3
But at that time, truth of the alleged libel could not be used as a defence,
nor would a jury decide the criminality of the libel. A jury could determine
only the fact of publication of defamatory matter, not whether the publica-
tion was truthful or defamatory." 4 The Peter Zenger case in 1735 and sub-
sequent history surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts allowed jury trial
of the fact of libel and the defence of truth." 5 In Nigeria, the question of
fact and defence of truth are matters tried before a judge without a jury, a
received English tradition.
1 6
In the 16th and 17th centuries in England, even advocacy to change the
law could be punished as sedition." 7 Private defamation could be tried as
sedition if it provoked bad blood and revenge thus disturbing the peace.
118
Remnants of these restrictions, although narrowed, appear in the above
definition of sedition. In other countries similar interpretations immunised
the soverign power from popular criticism, until the political revolutions
began to introduce a structure to distinguish legitimate from illigitimate
criticism of government. This English tradition remains influential to
Nigerian law, in addition to ethnic traditions where expression is
12 L. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press 5-13 (1985).
,13 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (London 1765-69), book
4, chap. 11, 151-52 quoted in Levy, note 112 at 13.1 14 L. Levy, supra note 112.
" Id. at 38-45, 297-349. See also, J. Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition
Laws and American Civil Liberties 418-433 (1956) (arguing that the truth provision of the
Sedition Act was virtually worthless to defendants because the judges' instructions held that
the defendants had to prove the truth of their writings, thus they were presumed guilty until
they could prove otherwise).
116 Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v. Chike Obi, [19611 All N.L.R. 186; Queen v. the
Amalgamated Press (of Nigeria) Ltd. and Another, [1961] All N.L.R. 199.
"7 L. Levy, supra note 112.
"8 Id. at 7.
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community-bound and less protective of individual self-expression. Truth
has been irrelevant to the definition of seditious libel, for governments have
greater fear of threats from truthful criticisms than from false ones.
2. Difference in Adapting Common Traditions
The current state of constitutional protection of free expression in the
United States differs substantially from the original meaning when free
speech was first protected in the Constitution of Pennsylvania and later
entered the national Bill of Rights. The Nigerian protection of free
expression at the present time is closer to the original understanding in the
American Constitution. The present Nigerian Criminal Code continues this
tradition, prohibiting seditious words or seditious publications, defined as
intending "to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection"
against the government; "to excite.., the inhabitants of Nigeria to attempt
to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any other
matter in Nigeria as by law established"; "to raise discontent or disaffec-
tion amongst ... inhabitants of Nigeria," or "to promote feelings of ill-will
and hostility between different classes of the population of Nigeria". 119
Traditional seditious libel thus receives less protection from the courts
under the evolving Nigerian Constitution than in the United States. In the
present state of emergency, for example, various measures have been taken
against journalists who publish detailed, not merely ideological, criticisms
of public officials. Moreover, since Nigeria has an official secrets act,
occasionally a journalist will be arrested for publishing information falling
under the category of "economic crimes". 120 Recently a well-known
Nigerian lawyer, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, gave an interview to quality
magazine, in which he called on Nigerians to have nothing to do with the
present Federal Government of Nigeria and made offensive remarks about
the Government. 121 He was promptly arrested and detained under Decree
No. 2 of 1984, making it an offence for any person to criticise the govern-
ment or any functionary of government. Many journalists have been placed
in prison for contravening the Decree. Often, they are released after being
9 Sec. 50(1), Criminal Code Cap. 42 Laws of Federation of Nigeria and Lagos 1958. Decree
No. 4 of the military government that came to power in 1984 specifically prohibited judicial
review of the decisions of the special tribunal set up to try journalists who published false
material or who ridiculed any public official. For a discussion of this decree, see Okagbue,
Development of Criminal Law and Procedure in The Challenge of the Nigerian Nation: An
Examination of Its Legal Development, 1960-1985, at 78-79 (T. Aguda ed. 1985). See also,
Karibi-Whyte, Sedition and Publication in Nigerian Press Law (T. Elias ed. 1969).
'20 May, Nigerian Military Regime is Reigning in One of the Freest Presses in Africa, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 30, 1984, at A7, col. 1; Cowell, The Free Press in Africa: Walking a Narrow Line,
N.Y. Times, May 13, 1983, at A2, col. 3; amd A Voice Out of Africa, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18,
1983, §6 (Magazine), at 92, col. 2; Nigerian Journalists Arrested, Washington Post, Apr. 9,
1987, at A43; and Legum, Africa's Journalists Battle Uphill to Get and Keep Press Freedom,
Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 24, 1986, at 13.
121 Letter to the author from Justice E. Ozobu, Anambra State Court, on file with the
author. The interview with Quality Magazines has not been verified.
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detained some time but before being charged in front of a judge. In the case
of Chief Fawehinmi, his lawyers obtained a writ of summons challenging
the Decree as unconstitutional. The security agent released him and the case
never was heard. Although the transition to civilian government will mean
the revision of emergency decrees, the constitutional questions of the power
of the Nigerian courts to hold a decree unconstitutional has yet to be
tested. 122
A distinct Nigerian tradition may be observed in the custom of arrest for
alleged sedition and then released after a lengthy detention but before
arraignment. 123 Moreover, in the Obi Case, decided soon after independ-
ence, the Nigeria Supreme Court upheld the old crime of sedition (defined
above) against a challenge under the new constitutional provisions
guaranteeing fundamental human rights. 124 However, in 1983 the Court of
Appeals in Anambra State challenged the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Obi. The appeals court unanimously reversed the conviction for sedition of
Chief Arthur Nwankwo who had published a book critical of the governor.
The justices stated that the law of sedition as applied to Obi violated the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. 125 The Obi case might
be questioned under the 1989 Constitution as a result of the challenge from
the Anambra State Court. 126 Because the human rights provisions con-
tained in the old constitution were not found to limit the sedition law as
enacted, however, the Nigerian Supreme Court may have to reinterpret the
continuing relevance of Obi.
Special problems may arise, however, with derogations from fundamen-
tal rights and judicial review of acts under emergency decrees. Nigerian
courts have attempted to construct a doctrine of narrow interpretation of
decrees that oust them of jurisdiction and to nullify by review any actions in
excess of the jurisdiction asserted in the decrees. 127 These restraints in
private expression may find justification in the human rights
conventions. 128
In the United States, the First Amendment requires the government to
justify intrusions on free expression according to even stricter judicial
standards to review. Independent and speech-protective balancing through
the courts preserves in the people the ultimate power over criticism. Neither
state nor Federal government has final say about when expression, in par-
ticular sedition, may be curtailed. The courts, as guardians of constitutional
122 Id.
123 Generally under Decree No. 2. See Fagbohun, Liberty, Fairhearing and the New Military
Decrees, 4 Journal of Private and Property Law 17, 30 (1985). See also Dept. of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1987, at 222-25 (1988).
124Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) v. Chike Obi, [1961] All NLR 186.
12 Nwanko v. State, FCA/E/111/83 (1983). See Nig. Const. of 1979, art. 36(1).
1
2 6 Supra notes 124 and 125.
127 Fagbohun, supra note 123. See Seng and Hunt, The Press and Politics in Nigeria: A Case
Study of Developmental Journalism, 6 B.C. Third World L. J. 85, 91 (1986).
128 See infra notes 149-159 and text.
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liberties, make that final judgement. The Supreme Court has the final say
whether a law passed by the Congress and approved by the President to
curtail expression critical of government violates the express prohibition
against abridging speech. That protection, though not perfect, gives practi-
cal meaning to the political philosophy that reserves political power to
individuals and groups in the private sector and empowers private resources
to control expression free from all but the most compelling restraints.
The Nigerian Constitution with a common tradition differently received
subjects private expression to a collective duty and penalties for sedition so
long as prescribed by law compatible with democratic society.
C. Difference in National Security Limitations
A limitation on free expression is possible for national security. Here again,
there are apparent differences between the American Constitution and the
Nigerian Constitution and its counterpart in the International Covenant. The
Pentagon Papers case is a good example of judicial interpretation of the nega-
tive command more protective of private expression than either the Nigerian
Constitution or the International Covenant. 129 Daniel Ellsberg, a former
Pentagon official, leaked the secret "Pentagon Papers" to the New York
Times during the Vietnam war, with a view to making them public. Nowhere
else, surely not in Nigeria or Europe, would he have succeeded so easily in his
purpose. The government attempted to enjoin publication because the papers
contained confidential government documents. The Supreme Court refused
to enjoin publication absent a compelling national interest showing
immediate danger as a result of publication. That case reflects the United
States tradition of reluctance to permit prior restraint or censorship of infor-
mation in the hands of the press, regardless of any illegal action in conveying
information to the press initially. Unlike Nigeria, Great Britian and most
countries, the United States has no official secrets act holding journalists or
citizens to account through criminal penalties for revealing government
secrets in their hands (the government did charge Ellsberg with espionage;
but because the FBI conducted an illegal search of his psychiatrist's office,
the charges were dismissed on grounds of abuse of prosecutorial discretion).
Controls on the classification of government information have tightened
considerably to serve the national security interest in the United States. For
example, a whistleblower named Samuel Morison, a civilian employee of
the Navy and son of a distinguished naval historian, is the first person in
United States history to have been convicted of espionage not for selling
secrets to the enemy, but for selling restricted information about ships to a
commercial publisher.' 30 By interpretation of the Espionage Act and other
'29 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
130 United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp 655 (D. Md. 1985) cert. den. 109 S. Ct. 259 (1988).
In another example of the Court's tightening controls over government information, a U.S.
citizen and a former CIA agent who resided abroad, Philip Agee, lost the privilege to carry his
U.S. passport because he published a list of CIA agents abroad thereby exposing them to
HeinOnline  -- 3 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 310 1991
 iste s  
,   t.    
t   l    t  
i    t   
 .  i , t, 
    
   
  i  t . 
   
   
    
 i  i s 
   
t r  r  r t i  t    t ti   
i ri  tit ti   it  t rt   l t.  
on rs  l ti   
ti    t ti      
tit ti   l t. 129  
t  ffi i l, l  t  t tagon ers"   
i    , .  
,  ,   
.  t t   ti    
t i  fi ti l t .    
t    t  l  
i i t  r   r lt f li ti . t    
t t  t iti   l t     i  
ti  i  t     ,     
i ti  t     i ,  
tri , t  it  t t    i i l  t   
iti  t  t t  i i l  t 
  ; 
t  t   t    t ist's  
    ri l  
tr ls  t  l ifi ti   t i   
i l    l    
  ,  
t       i ti i    
it  t t s i t r  t    i t   i   
t  t  t  ,  t  ti n  
i l r. 130    i ge   
129 e  rk i es . . it  t tes,  . .  ( 1). 
130 United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp 655 ( . d. 1985) cert. .  . . ). 
I  a t er e a le f t  rt's ti t i  tr l  r t i ti ,  . . 
citize  a   f r r I  t  r i  r , ili  , l t t     
.S. passport because e lis e  a list f I  ts r  t r  i  t  t  
Core Freedoms in Nigerian and U.S. Constitutions 311
measures, the Supreme Court has moved close to an implied official secrets
limitation on free expression similar to Nigeria's. We await another time for
an authoritative answer to whether the threat to national security justifies
the use of the Espionage Act in peacetime.
Both the Nigerian Constitution and the International Covenant make it
clear that for national security reasons, a government can restrict this kind
of publication under a law consistent with a democratic society. The
Nigerian sedition statute poses no constitutional problem to punishing vio-
lations from the press or from any citizen. 13 1 Under standards of judicial
review in the United States, any restrictions must be for the most compelling
reasons (presenting a clear and present danger). Might a treaty provision
without a reservation furnish such a compelling national interest? The
Supreme Court has struck down a law that prohibited signs or pickets
derogatory to a foreign government within 500 feet of that government's
embassy in Washington. 32 Obligations of international law to maintain
respect for foreign embassies did not provide a sufficiently compelling
national interest to limit political speech. That is a classic "no prior
restraint" case where the United States refused to punish seditious libels or
political criticisms against foreign governments proximate to their
embassies. The Supreme Court also to great public outcry extended the
right to symbolic free expression to burning an American flag on a court-
house steps in a political protest. 33 The Nigerian Constitution, in contrast
protecting a symbol of national unity, states that it "shall be the duty of
,, 134every citizen to ... respect the National Flag ... ".
D. Difference in Protecting Subversive Advocacy
Protection for subversive advocacy similarly differs in each country. As the
United States became more secure, free expression found greater protec-
tion. Prosecutions under the Espionage Act during the First World War for
publishing criticism of the draft and advocacy of action tending to curtail
production of war material provoked Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes to develop the "clear and present danger" test for
punishing subversive speech.1 35 During the twenties and thirties, the so-
called "Red-scare" or perceived threat from international communism and
danger. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). In another case Frank Snepp, a former CIA agent,
published a book about the CIA's operations in Vietnam. It contained nothing secret, but the
book was published without CIA approval as required in the initial conditions of employment.
Because he breached his agreement Snepp forfeited to the government all royalties from the
book under a theory of constructive trust imposed by the Federal District Court. Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
131 See supra note 119.
132Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
3 Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404
(1990).
134 Nig. Const. of 1989, Sec. 24(a).
135 See, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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revolution led to successful prosecutions under the criminal syndicalism
statutes in states such as New York and California. 1 36 But the values of free
expression were revealed best in Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v.
United States137 and in Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v.
California. 1
38
After sustaining convictions for Communist conspiracy advocating force-
ful overthrow of government during the MaCarthy era of repression, the
Supreme Court used Holmes and Brandeis to shape what has been accepted
by succeeding justices as the contemporary understanding of the limits to
subversive advocacy. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court reversed a convic-
tion under Ohio's criminal syndicalism law punishing advocacy of unlawful
acts. 139 The test became whether such advocacy incited imminent lawless
behaviour, in the Brandenburg case, racist slurs and white supremacist
verbal attacks were made while hooded Klu Klux Klan members, some
armed, stood by while the leaders spoke. These verbal assaults, according
the Supreme Court, did not directly incite violence or immediate unlawful
action that would justify the state to punish the speakers for the state-
ments. 140 The length to which the Supreme Court will protect speech despite
136 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927).
1
37Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Justice Holmes wrote in dissent:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no
doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you natur-
ally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech
seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared
the circle, or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your
power or your premises. But when men have realised that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,-that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market;
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That, at
any rate, is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Every year, if not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon
imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference
with the unlawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save
the country....
t38 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Justice Brandeis wrote eloquently,
concurring:
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear politi-
cal change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men,
with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of
popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless
the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportu-
nity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule
if authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the Con-
stitution. It is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and
assembly by showing that there was no emergency justifying it. [footnote omitted]
139Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).140 id.
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its racist or hateful message is demonstrated in the case of Smith v. Collin,
where the Federal courts allowed a group of neo-Nazis bearing swastikas to
rally in a predominately Jewish suburb of Chicago, in the face of city
ordinances prohibiting such marches.
141
The United States today protects freedom of individual expressions at
least as much, probably more, than any other country. Yet, a national
debate is under way over the control of the constitutional environment for
information made available through science and technology for various
purposes, from national security to advertising of commercial products and
political campaigns, as well as a civil environment for discourse involving
jarring hatreds and dissonant artistic expression. Some information,
collected by intrusive methods of snooping by governmental and private
groups alike, invades the most private of domains and the most proud and
traditional of cultures. Intimate details of individuals' private lives often are
made public despite damage to the integrity of reputations because the news
media service an insatiable market for revelations of a Senator's sexual
escapades or for political cartoons mocking a minister's self-righteousness
with parody. 142 The Court also upheld restrictions on playing loud rock
music in Central Park in New York City by discretion of sound tech-
nicians. 143 Other than these few instances, however, the Supreme Court has
not substantially revised its strong protection of communicative matter
criticising government.
Protection in Nigeria for subversive or offensive expression is close to the
international standards. Limits to such expression find legitimacy in public
order and morality through law consistent with a democratic society. The
power balances of structure underlying decisions limiting expression are
explicitly stated in the Constitution together with legitimacy for a public
purpose override of individual expression. These are not so easily found in
the American Constitution, for they derive through Court interpretation
and process, found in negative liberty. The tradition in Nigeria, however,
remains robust and as varied as the number of newspapers, customs and
local habits and modes of expression.
E. Difference in Private Libel Actions
In both countries, private libel actions affect the freedom of speech, but not
by prior restraint. In the United States, the Supreme Court has applied
freedom from government censorship to private libel suits against news
media defendants for defaming public officials or figures. The justification
141 Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. I11. 1978); aff'd, 578 F. 2d 1197 (7th cir., 1978);
cert. den. Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). See also earlier litigation enjoining the denial
of a parade permit, National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
142 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
143 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (regulation promotes a "substan-
tial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent regulation" not by
means least restrictive or intrusive).
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is to prevent undue risk of self-censorship by the media thereby chilling the
robustness of public debate. Before a public official or figure can recover
damages for libel against a media defendant, such a plaintiff must prove
malice-that is that the publisher knew of the falsity of the defamation or
acted in reckless disregard of whether it was true or not. 1' " Even private
persons allegedly defamed by the press now must prove falsity as well as
fault to recover damages. 145 The First Amendment in the United States
protects the press from the restraints implicit in the old common law doc-
trine of "libel per se" or strict liability for defamation of a private
reputation. The value of a vigorous, unintimidated press is more important
than occasional harm to reputation and far weightier than an offended offi-
cial's sensitivity.
146
In Nigeria, nowhere near the same degree of protection from common
law and statutory libel actions would be countenanced. Common law libel
remains unaffected by Constitutional standards. Defamed public officials
may bring ordinary libel actions without needing to meet a higher constitu-
tional standard of liability. For example, in 1984 a high court judge in
Lagos found that the Nobel Prize winner Wole Soyinka libeled a commis-
sioner of the former military government in his novel, The Man Died, and
ordered the book banned.
147
F. Comparing Constitutional Limitations on Free Expression with Human
Rights Conventions
One of the problems revealed at once is whether the human rights conven-
tions, even if not in effect but as they have drawn upon and in turn
influenced national constitutions, might give governments a good reason to
limit free expression more easily than otherwise permitted by the limitations
in the national constitution. In the United States, the freedom is assumed
under the First Amendment, and its positive grant unnecessary. The same
question might be suggested in justification of legislation or emergency
acts in Nigeria. A limitation upon government power presumes a pre-
existing liberty. Future content of the freedom of expression is defined by
what government cannot invade. Court interpretation, not an express
'"4New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
145 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
1
46 A controversy surfaced quite recently within the Supreme Court over whether the Court
has struck an improvident balance in protecting the value of all speech as against harm to repu-
tation or privacy interests. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
Justice White in a recent opinion favours reconsidering the entire constitutional protection of
defamatory speech and advocates returning to the original understanding. Id. As yet, this
opinion is a minority view. The debate extends as well to information which, if published,
might harm national interests broadly defined and controlled by the bureaucracy. In this
debate, the citizens' civil liberties to free expression for the purpose of enlightened choices in
self-government would be balanced against perceived dangers in a new age where the control
of information and media technology translates into political power.
147 Seng and Hunt, supra note 108 at 87.
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Constitutional override, defines in the United States when speech may have
to yield to compelling state interests. In contrast, both the Nigerian Consti-
tution and the human rights covenants assert the right affirmatively, as if
positively granted by the community, then allow a public order override
when necessary to further a democratic society.
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
based upon similar wording of the Universal Declaration, provides limita-
tions similar to those effectively adopted by the Nigerian Constitution.
When President Carter signed and sent the human rights treaties to the
United States Senate in 1978 for approval, he addressed the problem of
potential curtailment of free expression by adding reservations. 14 8 One of
the most significant reservations would limit the effect that Articles 5 and 20
of the Covenant might have. The fear is that those articles might authorise
restriction of the freedom of expression provided for in Article 19 in ways
incompatible with the broad range of expression protected by the courts
through interpreting the negative language of the First Amendment and
thus undercut protection for the freedom of speech and press in the Consti-
tution of the United States.1 49 Let us examine that claim by comparing the
free expression guarantees in each constitution against those of the
Covenant.
The first paragraph of Article 5 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights provides that nothing in the Covenant may be inter-
preted as implying for any State, group or person the right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
of freedoms recognised in the Covenant or at their limitation to a greater
extent than provided for in the Covenant. This provision indirectly might
have the practical effect of an international obligation that could empower
the government to limit freedom of speech beyond the current protections
under the Constitution. For example, one might interpret Article 5 to
obligate the government to forbid an individual from advocating that the
government change laws affecting the rights of others. Moreover, Article 20
requires affirmative government action to repress expression advocating
national racial or religious hatred inciting "discrimination, hostility or
violence". Because some of that expression may be constitutionally pro-
tected, the President's reservation states that the United States would not
interpret the Covenant as requiring or authorising legislation that would
restrict the right of free speech protected by the Constitution, laws and
practice of the United States.1 50 In a strict sense, of course, that reservation
begs the question whether a court would find conflict between the treaty
and the Constitution, for no treaty can enter into force intruding upon the
Bill of Rights, a negative limitation upon all power, including the treaty
power. The Nigerian Constitution would permit no greater restriction than
148 See Message of the President, note 59 above.
149 See text at page ???, for language of the First Amendment.
150See Message of the President, note 59 above.
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provided by the Covenant, but not as much freedom as the United States
First Amendment. But would the United States be in breach of an inter-
national obligation were it to fail to control private expression intruding
upon the liberties of other persons such as personal verbal attacks on public
figures or personal racial or sexual epithets?
The current test for determining whether to punish inciteful speech, when
combined with the limits upon libel suits against the media by public offi-
cials, offers much greater protection for speech criticising government,
advocating lawless behaviour or harming privacy or personal reputation
than provided under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. That Covenant aims more at prior government censorship than
sedition or libel, consequential harms. The private international human
rights organisation, "Article 19," was established in 1986 to promote free
expression and the right to receive and impart information. Its first World
Report 1988151 did not give prominence to whether other provisions of the
Covenant might undercut the strength of Article 19. For example, is the
speech protected in the Brandenburg case mentioned above, advocacy of
racism and white supremacism, prohibited under Article 20(2) of the
Covenant? As suggested earlier, by allowing private speech that advocates
national hatred based on race or religion, a government tolerates such
advocacy, even if it is not national policy. That tolerance seems to be at
variance with Article 20(2), which states:
Any advocacy of national racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by
law.
On the other hand, the provision could be interpreted consistently with
the First Amendment if the obligation simply means outlawing speech
amounting to official national advocacy of racial or religious hatred, not
the failure to prevent such private advocacy.' 52 Moreover, the First Amend-
ment's strict protection of speech criticising the government, libeling
individuals or offending public order or health or morals varies from the
spirit of the Covenant to safeguard "special duties and responsibilities"
owing to the rights of others, including the security and well-being of
certain cultural groups and the larger polity. Article 19(3)(a) permits restric-
tions on free expression to protect the "rights and reputations of others".
This provision, some argue, preserves the common law of libel for defama-
tion of officials.' 53 United States Constitutional law, in a narrow sense,
5 Information, Freedom and Censorship: The Article 19 World Report 1988 (1988).
152 Such a case involving Denmark's prohibition against private race and hate speech, Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions v. Jersild, is before the European Commission on Human Rights,
challenged by a television station that had been sanctioned under the law for reporting such
private speech. See Judgement of February 13, 1989, Supreme Court, Denmark, English trans-
lation by official translator.
15Information, Freedom and Censorship: The Article 19 World Report 1988, at 294
(1988).
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squares with the provision, for it permits libel actions by officials but only
for malicious defamation. Private individuals need only prove the libel false
and the media defendant at fault. In Nigeria, the received common law
appears consistent with the international standards allowing greater protec-
tion for defamation directed against anyone.
Article (19)(b) permits limitations on speech to protect national security.
That provision does not necessarily conflict with First Amendment pro-
tection in the United States. Supreme Court decisions permit limits to sub-
versive advocacy or sedition when the expression incites to imminent lawless
actions or danger. Finally, Article 19 permits limitations on expression to
protect the public order, health or morals. Supreme Court decisions, while
mainly speech protective, do allow bans on obscenity, appropriate zoning
of adult movies and bookstores, and restrictions on deceptive or objection-
able advertising and offensive or pornographic messages involving
children.
154
No facial conflict arises between the Nigerian Constitution and Article
19, the source of the Nigerian constitutional protection for free expression.
Articles 38 and 43 of the Constitution of 1989 are similar to Article 19(2)
and Article 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(compared above with the First Amendment and cases), in that the freedom
of expression is guaranteed subject to limits "in the interest of defence,
public safety, public order, public morality or public health.... I By way
of comparison, Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights confirms the right of free expression and adds to that right, the right
to receive information, subject to similar limitations.
While private racist, sexist and hate speech receives protection under the
First Amendment, in contrast with the Convention's duty in Article 20(2) to
'54 See e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (Court held obscene material is not pro-
tected under the First Amendment and set standard for determination of obscenity); Freidman
v. Rodgers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (Court upheld Texas law which prohibited the practice of optom-
etry under an assumed or trade name); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (Court held city of Detroit could enact special zoning laws relating to theatres showing
sexually explicit films); Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990) (Court held that Ohio law pro-
hibiting possession of child pornography complied with First Amendment).
1'5Nigerian statutes have modified little the common law on obscenity which defined
obscenity as "the tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall" The Children
and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act of 1961 defined as indecent any book or maga-
zine likely to fall into the hands of a child which portrayed the commission of a crime, acts of
violence or cruelty, or incidents of a repulsive nature, if the work as a whole would tend to
corrupt the child. Some defenses to a charge of violating obscenity laws exist. They are:
1) that the exhibition took place in a private home; 2) that the exhibition took place via televi-
sion or sound broadcasting; 3) that the person charged had no knowledge or any reason to
believe that the article in question was obscene because he had not examined the publication;
4) that the publication serves the public good because it is in the interests of science, literature,
art or learning; and 5) that the prosecution did not begin for more than two years after the
alleged offense. The last defense does not apply to violations of the Children and Young
Persons Act. See Adeyemi, Obscene and Indecent Publications in Nigerian Press Law (T. Elias
ed. 1969).
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318 Gordon A. Christenson
repress national advocacy of it, a possibility remains that under some
circumstances First Amendment jurisprudence might permit group libel or
civil penalties or damages for the harm caused groups by private racist,
sexist or hate speech.1 56 The provisions of Article 4 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
clearly would require modification of the current interpretation of the First
Amendment.157 At present, a state regulation of racist or hate speech (or a
libel action) must closely link malice or direct incitement to violence or
harm. The Supreme Court maintains, in the tradition of Justice Brandeis,
that unless no time is possible for public discourse to reveal the error of
racism and hate or expression tending to show subordination of women the
solution lies in public debates, not more repression of expression.1 58 When
despised minorities may speak out and advocate their passionately held
interests, free from repression, the danger that a single dominant faction
with an orthodoxy will take control and silence opposing factions
diminishes despite the verbal or symbolic conflict. In Nigeria with large
Muslim population, however, there may be limits to blasphemous speech
and the proclivity to stir ethnic violence. 
59
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Free expression and religious liberty always have been closely associated in
the Anglo-American tradition, from the time when church and state in
England merged under Henry VIII and sedition included heresy and
blasphemy. Similar linkages appear in the American and Nigerian Constitu-
tion and traditions.
A. Difference in Structure and Religious Culture
After the American Revolution, the new country separated church and state
in the national government through the First Amendment, but leaving the
possibility of establishments to the states. The religion clauses of the Bill of
Rights symbolise the second of Roosevelt's freedom. Expressed as simple
prohibitions upon the state, the clauses read: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . .". The two "religion clauses", one protecting against an estab-
lishment and the other protecting religious freedom may contradict each
other. Recent cases demonstrate the tension, for if the religious liberty of
one group is treated favourably, that preference itself may amount to an
establishment disfavouring other religions. In interpreting the clauses, the
most recent Supreme Court decisions tend toward accommodating religious
56 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Hustler Magazine v. Faiwell.
157 Supra note 84.
'
5 8 See supra note 138.
1
5 9 H. Nelson, supra note 17 at 220, 271-72.
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liberty even at the expense of some establishment. 6 ° Except for some, as
yet, minority views, no affirmative duty has been placed on government to
sustain religious liberty.1
61
Compared with the negative limitations in the United States Constitution
that guard against an establishment or government interference with re-
ligious liberty, the Nigerian Constitution guarantees religious freedom in
positive language: "Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion .. ,,162 The next two sections place restraints that
appear to favour religious choice. The first prevents an education system
from requiring unwanted religious instruction. The second prevents educa-
tion systems from prohibiting religious instruction in the public schools for
students of a particular religious community or denomination. Nigeria has
diverse religions, from the strong Muslim religions in the north to a multi-
tude of Christian religions in the south. Also traditional religions (some-
times referred to as animism) subside along side and often are incorporated
in the major monotheistic religions. 163 In contrast to the American distinc-
tion between public and private, the Nigerian structure prohibits any "place
of education" whether public or private from requiring religious instruction
of students in other than their own religious beliefs.
America also has wide diversity of religious beliefs from major organised
Catholic, Protestant and Jewish religions, to atheism, deism, New Age
cults, a rapid increase in Muslims (as many as Mormons) and Eastern
religions.' 64 The kind of prohibition found in the Nigerian Constitution
would entangle the state in private or parochial instruction, and would
accommodate religious liberty at the expense of an establishment problem
through public religious instruction even excusing those not wanting it.'
65
The public or a religious community might still provide religious instruction
in Nigeria for those of particular beliefs without any constitutional limita-
tion other than non-coercion. Moreover, to accommodate Muslims in
Nigeria, Article 6 and Articles 259 to 263 of the 1989 Constitution permit a
state to establish a Sharia Court of Appeals. 66 The Sharia is the Muslim
law that governs all conduct of Muslims, not distinguishing between reli-
gious and secular purposes. With this express exception, the Nigerian Con-
stitution, even as revised, has addressed the major question of
establishment not by prohibiting government assistance to religion or even
'60 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Choper, Defining Religion in the First
Amendment, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 579.; L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1283-88 (2nd
ed. 1988).
'6See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
'62 Nig. Const. of 1989, art. 37(1) (identical to art. 35(1) in the 1979 Constitution).
163 H. Nelson, supra note 16 at 123-24.
'" See desription of trends in J. Naisbitt & P. Anburdene, Megatrends 2000, 270-284 (1990).
165 Providing even voluntary religious instruction or voluntary prayer at a public school vio-
lates the establishment clause of the American Constitution. Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
'"The language is quite similar to that in the 1979 Constitution.
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by preventing the national government from interfering with state govern-
ments' own establishments (as some in America believe was the original
understanding in the American Constitution1 67), but by prohibiting any
official state religion through Article 11 of the 1989 Constitution (Article 10
in the 1979 Constitution): "The Government of the Federation or of a State
shall not adopt any religion as State Religion".
On November 28, 1988, as the 1979 Constitution was being revised, an
important constitutional event confirmed the extreme delicacy of the
balance of power expressed in the religion articles.168 The Constituent
Assembly then in the midst of revision erupted in acrimonious debate over
whether to continue the old Sharia court provisions in the new constitution
or whether to extend them by creating a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal.
Fearing outbreaks of religious violence and civil disorder between
Christians and Muslims, President Babangida decisively withdrew from the
agenda of revision the articles on Sharia courts, thereby allowing the status
quo worked out in the 1979 Constitution to remain. 16 9 The overriding con-
stitutional principle of no state religion seemed to undergird the action,
although some political observers thought that the Assembly was close to
compromise along the same lines and that "dousing the fire" of Sharia
merely postponed the inevitable conflict to a later time.
The decision in Nigeria to maintain decentralised structures and keep
current religious balances is remarkably similar to the original understand-
ing of the establishment clause's function in the American Constitution,
apart from a stricter separation of church and state. Congress was fore-
closed from passing any law "respecting an establishment of religion" thus
preventing not only a national establishment, but also keeping Congress
from interfering with the States' decisions whether or not to establish a state
religion and whether or not to aid establishments. 170 In Nigeria, the ban on
any state religion, whether state or federal, is clearer than in the original
understanding of the First Amendment, whose function kept the Federal
government entirely out of any state policy on religion. Only after the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the religion clauses did the establish-
ment clause apply as against the states.
17 1
167 See Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree; but see L. Levy, The Estab-
lishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment (1986).
168 See supra note 44 and text.
169 Hammer on Sharia Debate, in Newswatch, Nigeria's Weekly Newsmagazine, Dec. 12,
1988, at 14; Awe, AFRC takes Sharia off CA agenda, Vanguard [Nigeria], Nov. 29, 1988, at
1; and Decisive Decision, The Democrat [Nigeria], Dec. 1, 1988, at 1.
170 L. Levy, supra note 168.
171 Before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters (U.S.) 423 (1833). The Court held specifically in Permoli
v. New Orleans, 3 Howard (U.S.) 589 (1845) that the Establishment Clause did not apply to
the states. Although the Court held in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) that the
First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech and press was incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process clause and applied against the states, not until Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) did the Court specifically hold that the clause incorpo-
rated the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
HeinOnline  -- 3 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 320 1991
n . t nson 
ti  l  i  
t '  t li ts       
 i  167),   
      
 e t      
ligion". 
  , ,  
ti l   
  1 8 t 
l       
       
     
    
i ti   li , i t i    
 ,  
 . 6  
   , 
   
i     ing "   
 l   
    
s l  
  , 
    
ting t  i ion"  
  t,  
i  '    
   . o ,  
    
  t,  
 l   
   
l  as against the states. l7l 
167 See Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. ja/free; but see L. Levy, The Estab-
li t l : li i   t  i t t 6). 
168 See supra note 44 and text. 
169Hammer on Sharia Debate, in Newswatch, Nigeria's Weekly Newsmagazine, Dec. 12, 
, t ; ,  t  i    ,  ), . , ,  
r t ri ), , . 
170L. Levy, supra t  . 
171 Before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Bill of ights did not a l  t  t  
t t .  . lti r ,   . .)  3).  i ll  li 
.  le ,  r  ( . .)  5) t t t  t li t      
t  t t . lt  t  t l  i  itl  .  ,  . . ,  )  
irst t's r t ti  f fr  f   r   i r r t  i t  t  
t t  t's   l   ,   
ti ut,  . . ,  ( ) i  t  t i i ll  l  t t t  l  i
r t  t  r li i  l   t  i t t. 
Core Freedoms in Nigerian and U.S. Constitutions 321
Unlike European countries such as Italy whose Concordat with the
Catholic Church provides optional religious instruction in public schools
even after Italy separated the Church from the state, no religious instruction
may be provided in the curriculum of any public school in the United States
no matter how voluntary the student's choice may be. 172 Nor may the
government use taxes to pay instructors in private religious schools. 173 We
know from American history that paying ministers from public tax revenues
was the early practice in Virginia and Massachusetts, before the Revolu-
tion. 174 In contrast to Article 11 in the Nigerian Constitution prohibiting
any state or federal "State Religion", the American Constitution originally
did nothing to prevent the states from having establishments. The First
Amendment prohibited Congress only from establishing a national religion
or interfering with the states' choices "respecting an establishment of
,, 175religion' .
More clearly than in free speech we also see the relationship between the
central government and the states in a federal union. Just as the issue is of
paramount importance in Nigeria's debate over the Sharia, so also it occurs
regularly in Constitutional litigation and political controversy in the United
States. As recently as 1983 a Federal judge in Alabama ruled that the First
Amendment establishment clause prevented only the national government
from establishing or interfering with the state's power to establish or
disestablish religion. 176 The case challenged an Alabama law that required
a moment of silence at the beginning of each day for prayer or meditation.
A family objected to the coercive effect on the religious beliefs of their
172 Illinois ex rel, McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
173 Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
1741 S. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People 182-99, 242-46 (1972).
175 The amendment reflected the people's wish that the national government not establish a
national religion or affect the states' choices regarding an establishment of religion. L. Levy,
Constitutional Opinions: Aspects of the Bill of Rights 135-60 (1986). By the time the Four-
teenth Amendment was adopted, many states protected religious liberty in their own constitu-
tions and all had disestablished religion. See Anson Stokes' discussion of the process of
establishing religious freedom in the states in 1 Church and State in the United States: Histori-
cal Development and Contemporary Problems of Religious Freedom under the Constitution
358-446 (1950). As indicated supra note 171, the Court did not specifically apply the religion
clauses against the states until 1940. In 1943 the Court struck down a West Virginia law requir-
ing a flag salute and the pledge of allegiance as violative of religious liberty. West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In later cases the Supreme Court decided
that nondenominational prayer could not be required in public schools in New York (Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)); that the states could not require the Ten Commandments to be
posted on classroom walls in public schools (Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)); that public
school teachers could not teach even secular subjects in religious schools (Grand Rapids School
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)); and that direct tax support of religious institutions violates
the establishment clause (Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973). On the other hand recent decisions allow tax support or deductions to indi-
vidual families to use for transportation or tuition when made available neutrally to public and
private school student parents alike. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).17 6 Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S. D. Ala. 1983), rev'd Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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children in public schools if they were forced to participate in this "moment
of silence" for prayer or meditation. The trial court disagreed. The Bill of
Rights, the federal district court judge wrote, did not apply against the
states through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment. If a state
wanted to support religion, it could do SO. 17 7 This tention between the
national and state powers over religion (recall that all of the states had sepa-
rated religion from secular power well before the Civil War) reveals the
wisdom of federalism in dividing power when fueled by religious fervor.
The federal judge ignored contrary Supreme Court precedent and held that
under the states' reserved powers, Alabama could require a moment of
silence for prayer or meditation in the public schools at the beginning of the
day. When the Alabama case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens
sharply criticised the lower court judge for his interpretation that a state
could establish a religion if it so chose. 178 The opinion of the Court
emphatically reconfirmed and explicitly made clear that the Fourteenth
amendment did indeed extend the religion clauses to all citizens as against
the states.
B. The Courts and Politics in Religion
With national political campaign reflecting a majoritarian interest in
religion in public schools, Supreme Court interpretations have become a
political issue today in the United States. Putting prayer back in school .and
insisting upon enforcing values that are based on religion are issues in
presidential campaigns just as religious liberty and tolerance have political
and constitutional consequences in Nigeria. Recent presidential elections
focus on the kind of justices the President will appoint for life to the
Supreme Court, hoping that they may interpret the Constitution more to
the liking of the presidential majority view. 17' As the United States does not
have parliamentary supremacy to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court
in constitutional interpretations, the judicial philosophy of those appointed
to the Court may become controversial, as it was in the nomination and the
rejection by the Senate of Judge Robert Bork. °80 Because a democratic
majority cannot change the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, any such change must go through an onerous amendment process.
That is one of the structural protections afforded minority religions or
non-believers.
In Nigeria, the constitutional structure reflects the political balance to
accommodate religious pluralism. The guardian of an older constitutional
understanding of religious liberty and tolerance ironically has been the
177 id,
171 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
179 See e.g., Totenberg, Did Americans Vote for This, too? Christian Science Monitor, Nov.
24, 1980, at 23. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 64 (2d ed. 1988) (The Appointment
Process is political) and recent hearings, including the replacement for Brennan.
180 E. Bronner, Battle for Justice: How the Bork Nomination Shook America (1989).
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military government in recent years, although the courts will have a con-
tinuing role. Any change to the advantage or disadvantage of either the
Christians or Muslims (or traditional religions) easily could lead to the out-
break of violence between religious communities, as it did during the
Shagari government. 1 8' Having withdrawn the religion issue from the
agenda, the military government in effect took a constitutive action in
which most people have appeared to acquiesce. The constitutional result
gives further legitimacy to the courts in Nigeria to interpret the meaning of
the Constitution's religion clauses, thereby reinforcing the courts as
guardian of religious liberties in Nigeria under the 1989 Constitution.
The most recent decisions of the American Court continue the tradition
of religious liberty by accommodating the majority if no state endorsement
of religion or coercion against religious beliefs is attempted. Accommo-
dating various majoritarian religious beliefs while at the same time not
favouring any particular belief, while crucial to maintaining the peaceful
co-existence of various religious factions, suggests confusion. In both
Nigeria and the United States, the different political experiences and
constitutional processes nevertheless confirm a common problem. Using
state power in service of moral positions from religion often enflames civil
disturbance and inter-religious violence. Indeed, Justice Brennan has
explained that if the secular state helps religion, then it is in danger of
corrupting the sacred; the secular power captures the sacred.18 2 When the
state political process favours one religion over another or gives tax support
to religion, the state creates political insiders and outsiders,' 83 and bitter
resentments of one religion against another or against civil government,
nearly always lead to passionate intolerance and even to a breakdown in
civil government. In thousands of ways, a dominant orthodoxy may repress
unpopular cults and newer sects that threaten orthodox beliefs; the resent-
ment and rage from repression directly leads to fanatical reaction and often
violence.
There are few easy answers to the political dilemma of a world of many
religious beliefs and non-beliefs other than tolerance.184 The American
8' As it did in the Shagari era in the Kano riots. See H. Nelson, supra note 16 at 271-72.
182 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183 Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in a contemporary interpretation, has
developed a potentially influential guide to court decision as to when a state makes a law
"respecting an establishment". In the silent prayer case, Wallace v. Jaffree, she wrote a con-
curring opinion expanding the three-part Court-developed test a law must pass in order not to
constitute an establishment of religion. The test, enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971) stated that to pass Constitutional muster against a claim that it is an establishment
of religion, a law or regulation must 1) have a primary secular purpose, 2) neither advance nor
inhibit religion and 3) not excessively entangle church and state. This abstract signpost was
given significant meaning by Justice O'Connor's view that a law must not endorse a religion,
thereby creating political insiders and outsiders, nor coerce any belief. In an earlier case, Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), Justice O'Connor concurred in holding that a Christmas
creche that formed part of a wider display of secular symbols did not convey a message of
political insiders and outsiders when viewed objectively.
'8 Richards, Toleration and the Constitution 165-227 (1986).
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324 Gordon A. Christenson
Constitution, by separating church and state succeeds as well as any and
better than most in this endeavour. Protecting against state action that
creates political insiders and outsiders based on belief minimises the
retaliation that might threaten civil order where the disfavoured outsiders
are repressed and later could become an impassioned and violent political
faction.' 8 5 By ensuring religious liberty with equal treatment and with no
state laws favouring any establishment, broader civil and political liberties
and democratic social order is preserved, especially when free expression
protects robust debate among diverse religious points of view. Religious
political factions, within these limits, may argue vigorously and seek to have
their interests reflected in the legislative process, also protected by the
freedom of expressing.
The tradition of pluralism in religious beliefs and tolerance of religion,
when freedom of expression thrives, reduces the danger of religious
factions. The legitimacy for expressing deeply-held views in a political
process, accompanied by the tolerance for compromise, is an ironically
secular method of humanising religious intolerance and its own justification
for separating church from state. From the Nigerian Constitutional
experience, Dale Omotunde, a professor of communications, wrote an
essay on tolerance in the aftermath of the Sharia controversy. It had a
universal theme:
Tolerance is not only needed to avoid disaster, but is also needed if a
community is to remain healthy. Unfortunately extremism has no room
for tolerance. It is in the iron hold on dogma and not in the dogma itself
that the danger lies. Because intolerance has no room for compromise an
intolerant community-be it in politics or in religion-is headed for
violence and collective suicide.
An executive fiat alone may not solve the problem. It is like prescrib-
ing aspirin for rheumatism, a mere palliative. The ban on the sharia
debate is a stop-gap. The fundamental monster of religious intolerance is
still alive, spoiling for a fight another day. History, as always, has a way
of repeating itself, but man in his infinite folly has a habit of not learning
from the past.1
8 6
C. Difference in Accommodating Religious Freedom to Majority
The United States Supreme Court has been working out a jurisprudence to
justify limits upon religious freedom when a compelling or significant state
or national interest collides with religious belief. Over a hundred years ago,
the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting polygamy as practiced in Utah
by the Mormons.18 7 Yet, more recently, the Amish, a gentle religious
165 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
186 Dele Omotunde, The Squirrel and the Tree, in Newswatch, Nigeria's Weekly News-
magazine, Dec. 12, 1988, at 13.
187 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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farming people, were relieved of compulsory public education for their
children after the eighth grade, in order to fuilfill the religious requirements
to learn skills in their community through working. 188 Members of the same
religious group, however, were not relieved from paying Federal social
security taxes when employing their own members even though they refuse
retirement benefits and take care of their own. 189 Seventh-Day Adventist
have been relieved of burdens for refusing to work on their sabbath as
required by their religion. 190
In Nigeria when official elections were held on Saturday, thousands of
Adventists protested the infringement of their religious liberty, citing the
human rights provisions of the new Constitution. The Supreme Court of
Nigeria refused to determine the issue arguing that the election would have
turned out the same even if the Adventists had all voted for the losing
candidate. 191
We see an increase of similar restrictions on religious liberty in the United
States as well. When a significant government institution or programme is
being administered by neutral nondiscriminatory regulations, burdens on
religious practices may be justified. Military regulations may prohibit
religious headgear such as yamulkas and turbans. 192 Native Americans may
not be exempted from furnishing social security numbers as a condition for
receiving food stamps even if identity by a number violates their religious
belief. 193 Muslim inmates in a maximum security prison have no right to
attend their Friday religious services as a group when the services conflict
with work assignments and security rules.' 94 Native Americans cannot
prevent the government from building a road that would disrupt a sacred
place on public land where religious rituals demand serenity and
isolation.1 95 Nor is the use of peyote for religious ceremonial purposes
exempt from criminal laws against using drugs generally. ' 96 A public school
"secular humanism" curriculum required of all children does not unduly
burden the religious liberty of children of fundamentalist religious
families. 197 "Scientific creationism" based on the Bible may not be required
188 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
189 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
19°Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
'"'Dickson Ojeigbe & Another v. Marcus W. Ubani & Another, [1961] All N.L.R. 277.
192 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
193Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
194 O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
195 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).196 Employment Div, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110S. Ct. 1595 (1990). In
lowering the scrutiny from requiring a compelling government interest to something less, Justice
Scalia said the Court's precedents applying the compelling state interest test "have nothing to do
with an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct". He said Ameri-
can society would be "courting anarchy" if the Court endorsed the approach of granting "consti-
tutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind".
He explained that minority sects may well have to accommodate the majority in these matters.
197 Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987); Mozert v. Hawkins
County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
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as part of the public school curriculum. Nor can a state require Biblical
creationism to be offered whenever scientific human evolution is taught,
even when Darwin's theory contradicts the religious beliefs of some
children. 98 That task is left to the churches. The history of religion,
however, may be taught. The Supreme Court recently decided that a
Christmas creche in a public place violated the Establishment Clause, but
that a Jewish Menorah may be displayed with a Christmas tree outside
a public building.1 99 Recently a federal court in the district of Columbia
held that the Marine corps cannot maintain a Roman cross on one of
its bases.200
D. Comparing Constitutional and International Standards
The Nigerian Constitution reflects almost literally the international
provisions protecting freedom of religion. Article 18(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion
or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice and teaching.
The African Charter20 ' and Article 37(l) of the 1989 Nigerian Constitu-
tion essentially restate this provision. The United States Constitution and
cases interpreting it protect religious liberty at least as much, as explained
above. However, the International Covenant also provides that freedom to
manifest one's religion may be subject to limitations to protect public
safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others. Again, while the United States' cases which limit the free exercise of
religion seem to be consistent with this provision, one could interpret the
limitations as providing a stronger basis than presently recognised for
burdening such liberties.
Unreported Nigerian Constitutional Caselaw suggests that an action for
nuisance stemming from religious worship would be upheld. 20 2 Similar
interpretations of limitations in the 1979 Nigerian Constitution found in
19Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
'99 County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
200 Jewish War Veterans v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988).
201 African Charter on Peoples' and Human Rights, art. 8: "Freedom of conscience, the
profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed. No one may, subject to law and
order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms".202 Odugbesan v. Ogunsanya & Others, Suit No. LK/354/70, delivered Feb. 9 1970
(unreported Coram, Adefarasin J.), referred to in correspondence with author from the Hon.
Mr. Justice E. Ozobu, High Court Abakaliki, Nigeria, March 2, 1990.
HeinOnline  -- 3 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 326 1991
on . istenson 
 .    
is     , 
 '      
. 1   s.   
r,     
  t ,  
 h   
1  t i  
     
. 200 
 l  
    l 
 )  ti al 
  
       
    
 ,    
      t   
rs i , s r , r ti   t i . 
  r 1  1)  
l    i   
 i t r r ti  it r t t r li i  li rt  t l t  ,  l i  
,  ti al     
i t '  li i    j t    t  
, ,    t l  f 
t . i , il  t  it  '      
r li i   t   i t t it  t i  i i ,  l  i t t t  
li it ti   r i i   t  i  t  tl  i   
  
 l  t   
i  t i      0  
i t r r t ti s  li it ti  i  t   i ri  tit ti   i  
198 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
199 .  urgh  9). 
200 Jewish War Veterans v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988). 
201 African Charter on Peoples' and Human Rights, art. 8: "Freedom of conscience, the 
r f ssi   fr  r ti  f r li i  ll  r t .   , j t t  l   
,      s". 
2020dugbesan v. Ogunsanya & Others, Suit o. /354170, li r    
 , i  e  
r. J sti  . , i  rt li i, i ri , r  , . 
Core Freedoms in Nigerian and U.S. Constitutions 327
Article 41(1)(a), and identical provision in the 1989 Constitution, which
states:
Nothing in [article] ... 36... shall invalidate any law that is reason-
ably justifiable in a democratic society-(a) in the interest
of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public
health....
The United Nations declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief mirrors the
language of the International Covenant and the Nigerian Constitution, with
one interesting alteration. While the International Covenant guarantees the
right to have or adopt a religion, the Declaration omits the term
"adopt" 23 The drafters omitted this phrase in order to avoid an implicit
approval of proselytising, thought to accompany colonialism. 2  The 1979
and 1989 Nigerian Constitutions retained the freedom "to manifest and
propagate" religion.20 5 The strong tradition of free speech in the United
States together with free exercise jurisprudence would probably not permit
limits upon proselytising in the United States beyond those limits set by
neutral time, place and manner restrictions. The same conclusion would
seem to follow from the Nigerian Constitution.
E. Summary of Difference in Structure and Culture
In summary, religious freedom and tolerance, one of Roosevelt's four
freedoms, still drives constitutive processes both from within countries and
through international human rights instruments. In comparing the
American and Nigerian experience, the two constitutions now limit
decisions of both the state and the federal governments in either endorsing
particular religions or in burdening religious liberties. In comparing the
religious liberties of the two countries with the international human rights
instrument, they show common and universal concerns, especially in the
relationship between religion and democratic government, where freedom
of expression of diverse belief and religious factions not threatened in the
political process make good government possible. The sameness of values,
however, does not find similarity in structure or power. The African
religious and local traditions are central ways of life mirroring in many ways
the express Constitution while barring the State from establishing any one
as a State religion. The State does, however, support various religious
beliefs through family and community choices. The problem of accommo-
dation to the dominant religions by minority sects is troublesome. In
America, religious practices are more private and the tradition is to keep the
State out. Dominant religious beliefs in particular places, however,
2°3G. A. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, UN Doc. A/36/51 (1981).
2 4 D. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the U.N. Declaration
on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 487 (1988).205 Nig. Const. of 1979, art. 35(1); Nig. Const. of 1989, art. 37(1).
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increasingly find accommodation by courts so long as the religious liberty
of others is not coerced. Freedom of expression appears to protect minority
cults in the United States more than the Establishment clause.
PROPERTY AS HUMAN RIGHT
Just as the negative limits placed by the American Bill of Rights upon the
power of national or state governments protect the positive values of human
dignity, so also "property" rights similarly are grounded in a people's
general welfare and security through incentives and rewards for productive
work and the fair distribution of surplus. While liberal democracies such as
the United States favour the private sector and provide less of a role for
government control of the means of production than socialist states, all
societies, including the Nigerian, expect their governments to provide for
the general economic well-being directly or through the legal system of
protection. Nigeria has been working out according to its own traditions,
history, and values the appropriate mix and balance between the public and
the private sectors. This mix provides a nation's system of incentives to
produce and distribute public and private goods, such as food, housing,
medical care, education, transportation and other necessary products and
services. All societies provide incentives for productive work and invest-
ment. "Property" is the main symbol for expressing the idea that human
beings as individuals or co-operatively ought to benefit from the fruits of
productive work and have protection against bullies or powerful govern-
ments unjustly taking the fruits of labour or investments. The Nigerian and
American Constitutions both provide some protection for "property". Yet
each society also provides a way to subordinate individual selfishness to the
common good through taxes, government programs and regulation.
"Private property" is the right to exclude others from interests in land or
things, or from taking or preventing just rewards for meritorious work or
return on investment. All societies aspire to provide some security for
human individuals or groups to be free from the intrusions of the more
powerful in these private economic expectations.
The task is not to justify one ideology as against another for the most
productive and just society but to examine how the United States and
Nigerian Constitutions each treat property as a human right and to compare
that difference with the various international human rights instruments.
Here, we must first distinguish between the personal or group private right
and the general welfare, a distinction drawn in both constitutions. The com-
parison will be understood best if we refer first to the international human
rights regarding property or economic well-being.
A. International Treatment of Property and Well-Being
The international human rights community refers to rights of development
as "second generational" entitlements for economic, social and cultural
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rights, derived from the duty of co-operation placed on each country by
consensus of the international community of states or in its constitution, in
contrast with "first generational" rights of civil or political liberty or
negative limits against the State. We best see these positive aspirations in the
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The right of self-
determination expressed in Article 1 of the latter Covenant, for example,
confirms the autonomy of each people to control and dispose of their
wealth and resources for the development and welfare of the country.
Different standards of treatment of property when taken for public use and
even for protection of private property appear in the conventions.
Specific provisions in the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights
place an emphatic duty upon all African states to ensure the right to
development and the "right to property" subject to laws expressing the
general interest of the community. The wording of the African Charter
guarantees work over private property. Article 14 states: "The right to
property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest
of public need or in the general interest of the community . . .". There is no
guarantee of protection of individual ownership of property.206 The right to
work, protection of families, right to education and the protection of
morals and traditional community values are entitlements that fall upon
each African state under the Charter. If a "people's" property is unjustly
taken from them, they have the collective right to its lawful return as well
as to adequate compensation.20 7
These well-known anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic provisions assume
analytic importance in comparing these notions of property with those
protected under the United States Constitution. There are differences,
of course; but many of the same anti-colonialist values inhere in both
the United States Constitution and in the African Charter as well as
in specific African constitutions. The main difference, one that spans
200 years, is between the affirmative obligation of the state in the
African Charter implying a centralised economy with guarantees, in con-
trast with strong doubts in the United States Constitution about giving the
central state too much power over the means of production. The central
governmental role for development economics especially in Third World
countries is being challenged by a number of experienced developmental
208economists.
206 Motala, Human Rights in Africa: A Cultural, Ideological, and Legal Examination, 12
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 373 (1989), argues that private ownership of property should
not be considered a universal right, because traditionally in Africa ownership of property was
communal.
20 7 African Charter, arts. 14-18, 21, 22. But see §28 of the Land Use Act of 1978 which states
that the right of occupancy can be revoked for a public purpose without compensation.
208 See P. T. Bauer, Reality and Rhetoric: Studies in the Economics of Development (1984),
especially chapters 6 through 9 on Africa and Nigeria.
HeinOnline  -- 3 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 329 1991
 s  rian   titutions  
ti    
 ti al    i ,  
irst rational"     
    i s  
r, l ti n  ,  
t ti l t  liti l  i il i t   t  t ti l 
 i , l . 
i  l   t, , 
i  t  t    l       
lt     t  l t  l   t  t . 
  t rt    
  rt    ti s. 
i i  i i  i  t  i  t r    s'  
l   ti  t         
t  ht erty"   
     
   e  
 .   t 
   it  . .   
  i      206  
, t ti   ili , i t t  ti   t  t ti  f 
i l t    
   r.  ple's" t   
   
 i . 20  
  i l  i ti    
 i    
   .  s, 
l i list  
 i     
   ,   
,  ti e i    
r  i  t es, 
      
   .  
tal t    
i    r  t l 
i ts.208 
206 Motala, Human Rights in A/rica: A Cultural, Ideological, and Legal Examination, 12 
  o ),   t   
r  l    i  rt   
l. 
207 African Charter, arts. 14-18,21,22. ut see §28 f t    t   
   i   ti . 
 ,  t ric:  i s j , 
  i . 
330 Gordon A. Christenson
B. Property in United States Constitution
The United States Constitution expresses no affirmative duty on govern-
ment to provide for basic human needs. A structure of law-making power
was delegated, however, by which the needs of future generations might be
provided. We now live in different times and cultural situations. Much
social and economic legislation, both state and Federal, responds to the
post-industrial, highly interdependent society of today that creates new
problems of human need. In the preamble to the United States Constitution
we find five major purposes of government, including a general welfare
clause. Some scholars believe that this provision, together with the power in
Congress under Article 1 to provide for the general welfare of the United
States and to regulate commerce, places upon the national government
through Congress the responsibility to provide for the general welfare.20 9
Nothing better states the purpose of the Constitution than its preamble.
2 '0
Government's purposes are to establish justice and secure "the blessings of
liberty" subject to providing for the common defence, the general welfare
and domestic tranquility. While the Constitution provides no specific
economic entitlements of property or welfare, it does provide the power to
fulfill the responsibility of Government for the general welfare and hence
the new property concepts grounded in entitlement legislation protected by
due process.2 1
The American Constitution, contrary to popular opinion, nowhere
requires a private capital or free-enterprise economy, although a consensus
developed in the 19th century to protect private enterprise, and a structure
is now entrenched. It does protect private property from confiscation or
arbitrary government action. But all property is subject to reasonable
209W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States (2 vols.,
1953; vol. 3, 1981).
210 Preamble, U.S. Constitution:
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.
211 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assistance benefits could not be terminated
without an opportunity for a hearing before termination) and Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593 (1972) (junior college teacher might be able to establish at a hearing that the junior college
had the equivalent of tenure). The Court noted in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576
(1972) that a prerequisite of Fourteenth Amendment due process protection was the present
enjoyment of the statutory entitlement. That is, the property right was derived from state
action. See C. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964) and F. Michelman, Property
as a Constitutional Right, 38 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1097 (1981). See also L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 685-718 (2d ed. 1988). At the same time, the Court declined to create
rights. See e.g., San Antonio Indep, School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), reh'ing
denied 411 U.S. 959 (1973) (Court reversing a district court ruling that the Texas school financ-
ing system violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and declaring
that education was not a constitutional right). However, states have an independent power to
create property rights in their constitutions. See e.g., Rose v. Councilfor Better Educ., No. 88-
SC-804-TG slip op. (Ky Sept. 28, 1989) and Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kriby, 777 S.W.
2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
HeinOnline  -- 3 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 330 1991
  .  
. it d  tit t  
 it  t s t ti  s ti e  r -
t     s.  t re  i   
, ever,     ti s  
i e .  t  t r l i .  
i l  i  i l ti , t   r l,   
t-i strial,  ent t      
l s   .  l     i  
 s  t,  l  
. li  t  , t r  
r   i  l     
  t  r e, l s  l t 
 r ss      l . 209 
tt  t t  t e purpose of the Constitution than its preamble.21o 
'    i   e  
t " t   ,  l  
ti  ilit . t ti   
   ,  r  
   t l r   
 ts  t    
.211 
  i ,    ,  
i  ,  
   ,  
.  t   i   
 t .   t      
209W. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the ist ry j t  it  l ., 
l.  ). 
210Preamble, U.S. Constitution: 
 t  l  f t  it  t t , i  r r t     t i , t li  ti , 
it ,  ,   
     i   
  . 
211 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assistance benefits l  t  t i t  
it t  t it        rry . ,  . . 
         ~ l        
 t  i l t f t r ).  rt t  i   j t  . t ,  . . ,  
  
r  .   
, erty, .  perty 
 titutional t,   ).    
 ).  
,  l ep, ist. i uez, . ), 'ing 
i  . ) 
   
 , i  
t cil/or tt  
 l . ist. i y,  
 
Core Freedoms in Nigerian and U.S. Constitutions 331
regulation and may even be taken and redistributed for public purpose, so
long as just compensation is paid. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion makes this explicit. Sometimes other human rights are more important
than property rights. For example, states may require private shopping
centres to permit free expression, even if the owner does not like the speech,
without violating the Constitution.212 Supreme Court Justice Thurgood
Marshall has written in an opinion that at some point a Federal interest in
protecting private property as a human right would outweigh others' rights
to free expression, but that the property interest in a private shopping centre
did not qualify, so long as the state's constitution reasonably allowed such
free expression there and the owner could freely indicate his or her views.
213
The states may take private property from one owner and give it to
another for the public purpose of providing housing for low-income
families, so long as just compensation is paid. In the 1960s, the State of
Hawaii redistributed residential parcels on huge private estates covering
much of the land in the Hawaiian Islands to persons who were leasing their
homes built on the estates. Fair market value had to be paid to the owners,
but taking from one and giving to another was not unconstitutional. 14 The
role of the Federal Courts in cases such as these is to review the state action
to see that so-called "naked transfers" indeed serve a reasonable public
purpose and that just compensation is paid.
The Nobel Prize winner James Buchanan of George Mason University in
Virginia and others have been working for many years on a theory of public
choice that examines the economic and power incentives of state officials in
their public decisions. 21 5 The studies show that in order to keep power,
officials often "rent" their offices for personal advantages that lead to
deferring or passing on to the people the actual costs of public decisions.
The result often deters efficient economic development. For example, when
voters refuse to raise taxes that could be used to pay for land taken from
private owners, a public zoning commission may try to use its power to
obtain from a developer a public benefit such as an easement. Another
example is the use of high tariffs to protect inefficient local industries and
to give favorable treatment to exports by subsidies.
In some situations regulations redistribute wealth. The courts decide
when such regulations are takings, not the public officials. If these
situations are in reality "regulatory takings", then the taxpayers as a whole
should bear the cost. The great difficulty, and one that judicial review
uniquely serves to remedy, is when the public choices by officials unfairly
burden the owners of private property for the benefit of others. Recently,
212 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
213 Id. at 91-94 (Marshall, J., concurring).
214 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
215 See, J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Con-
stitutional Democracy (1962); for further explanation of public choice theory, see D. Mueller,
Public Choice (1979) and R. Hardin, Collective Action (1982).
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the Supreme Court said that the California Public Utilities Commission
could not require an electric utility company to include messages opposing
rate increases in its billings.2  Here the free speech of the property owner
not to communicate unfavourable messages outweighed the Commission's
interest in wanting customers to have information against rate increases.
More recently, the Supreme Court held that a coastal zoning requirements
of an easement before a building permit could be granted was a compens-
able taking.2 17 And the denial of permission to rebuild a church-owned
camp washed out in a flood was a compensable temporary taking for the
period.218 On the other hand, a complex environmental mining regulation
requiring certain pillars of coal to be left in the ground to prevent
subsidence from subsurface mining was not a taking. 219
While the Constitution and Bill of Rights protect property from uncom-
pensated takings by governments, nothing prevents a state from taking
ownership of the means of production if it capitalises it from tax revenues
by consent of the people's representatives. Since the rents of political office
nearly always add cost and inefficiency in production and distribution of
goods and services, the question of social and economic justice almost
always falls to the democratic legislative process of bargaining, where the
votes of the people's representatives might provide mutual benefits without
social upheaval.
Until President Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930's the Supreme Court
struck down legislative enactments that burdened private enterprise. With
new Court appointments and more deferential judicial review of laws
passed by democratic majorities in economic welfare cases, a social
revolution occurred, focused on Roosevelt's Four Freedoms mentioned
earlier. Later on, the Supreme Court introduced standards of judicial
review to ensure Constitutional status to government entitlements provided
by statute. 2 Currently controversial is the question whether any conditions
in government programmes unconstitutionally transfer wealth from one
private group to another. Professor Richard Epstein thinks that the courts
should apply strict judicial standards of review in addressing the question:
The object of government is to maximise the co-operative surplus of
human activities in all domains, and the object of the Court is to help
ensure effective government. The Court therefore should not sanction
abuses of the political process, whether they offend speech, liberty or
property. Instead, a presumption of distrust should attach to all
government action. That presumption should allow the Court to
organise its thinking on unconstitutional conditions in particular and
21" 6Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).217Nolan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
2 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
2 9 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
220 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
HeinOnline  -- 3 Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 332 1991
 . t son 
  ia  
      
 .216  t   
 l   i sion's 
   
 tl , t     
 t   
2   
   l    
.2ls ,    
 
  . 1  
il  t  tit ti   ill  i t  t t t   
  ts, t   
    
   ' t ti es.   
   f 
,  i   
l  ll   t  tic   i ,  
t    '   t 
 . 
'     
   .  
 t i t t    ti l     
   ,  
l ti  r ,  '    
li . t  ,        
i  t   l  t   
 . 20  l   
 t s tit ti ally r  
t  . r     
 i l    
 j t f r t i  t  i i  t  ti  l  f 
 ti iti    , t  
    
   ,  
t . t ,     
t .   
  l    
216   . l  ' . 6). 
217 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
218 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church oj Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 
7). 
219 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
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constitutional law in general around one proposition: where the Court
routinely allows strategic behaviour and implicit wealth transfers by
government, there constitutionalism ends.221
In partial agreement, Professor Kathleen Sullivan would apply a "good
society" model drawn from Aristotle and the tradition of civic republican-
ism to define unconstitutional conditions.222 For her the Constitutionality
of conditions aimed at wealth distribution would depend upon a degree of
scrutiny of the condition (say of allowing a permit to build a house near a
beach on the granting of an easement) that corresponded to a standard of
review for the initial action. Constitutionalism might then offer support for
affirmative redistribution of wealth between private parties less than a com-
plete naked transfer. 223 This community-oriented view of economic well-
being seems more compatible with the Nigerian culture and also its constitu-
tional structure for defining property and limiting it for community
purposes. The localised and small community tradition of trading and cus-
tomary use by possession, however, creates a powerful counter-poise to
centralised ownership.
C. Property in Nigerian Constitution
The purpose for the Nigerian Constitution of 1989 (as well as the earlier
versions) is to promote "good government and welfare of all persons in our
country on the principles of Fredom, Equality and Justice.. ." and "the
Unity of our people". Also expressed, in contrast to the American
preamble, is the idea of national sovereignty "under God dedicated to the
promotion of inter-African solidarity, and world peace, international co-
operation and understanding" .224
The Nigerian Constitution requires substantial national planning and
management of the major sectors of the economy, as an explicit policy
directive. Traditional property interests are protected from compulsory
taking without compensation through the courts. But ownership of sub-
surface mineral and natural gas rights is allocated to the Government, as is
2' -the ownership of the mass media other than newspapers. '; Group or
"peoples" rights in property as such find no explicit protection except
through general provision.
In Nigeria much of the recent constitutional discussion about property
has centred on the Land Use Act of 1978, which declared that lands are to
be held in trust for the people. Both the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions
contain provisions declaring that nothing in the constitution invalidates that
22'Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State
Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harvard Law Review 5, 104 (1988).
22Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1415 (1989).
"2id. at 1499-1500.
,,4 Nig. Const. Preamble.
:25 Nig. Const. arts. 42(1)(3) and 38(2).
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act.226 Nonetheless, the courts have split on the constitutional standing of
the act. In Kwocha v. Governor of Anambra State227 and L.S.D.P.C. v.
Foreign Finance Corp. 228 judges suggested that the Act had precedence
over the Constitution. On the other hand, in Dada v. Governor of Kaduna
State229 and in Kanada v. Governor of Kaduna State and A nor. ,23o judges
ruled that any provision of the Act conflicting with the Constitution was
void. When Dada was appealed, the Supreme Court declined to decide the
question of precedent.23'
Much of the controversy surrounding the Act relates to the vesting of all
the land in a state in the governor, to be held in trust for all Nigerians. The
act empowers the governor to grant a statutory right of occupancy over any
land. However, pre-existing rights are not to be disturbed, and local govern-
ments have the power to grant a customary right of occupancy over non-
urban land.232 The process of condemnation for public purposes begins
when the governor sends notice of revocation of the right of occupancy
which is effective immediately and no compensation is due,233 but the
occupant's unexhausted improvements are compensable.234 Although the
governor's power was vested during a time of military rule, in Nkwocha v.
Governor ofAnambra State, the power of a civilian governor also to revoke
the right of occupancy was upheld.235
The public use requirement in both countries is the only effective check
on the government's power to take property so long as compensation is
paid. In contrast to the United States Supreme Court's expansive definition
of public use in Midkiff, Nigerian courts have held that the public use
226For a discussion of the act and developments leading to its passage, see Oluyede,
Development in Land Law and Law of Conveyancing in the Challenge of the Nigerian Nation:
An Examination of Its Legal Development, 1960-1985, at 96-120 (1985).
2276 S.C. 362 (1984).
228 1 NWLR 413 (1987).
229 FCA/K/12.
2304 NWLR 36 (1986).
231 For a discussion of the Land Use Act and its constitutional position, see Omotola, Vol-
canic Development in Nigerian Law of Real Property, 14 Nig. J. Contemp. Law 46
(1984-1987); J. Omotala, Law and Land Rights: Whither Nigeria?, Inaugural Lecture Series
(1988); Oyewo, Right to Property and Forfeiture of Assets, 8-9 J. of Private and Property Law
87 (1987-1988); Fekumo, Does the Land Use Act Expropriate?-A Rejoinder, 8-9 J. Private
and Property Law 5 (1987-1988).
232 §§5-6, 34, 36. Considerable similarity exists between the Land Use Act of 1978 and the
United States government policy toward Native Americans and their land. In both situations,
the government declared that the lands would be held in trust and that the inhabitants had a
right of occupancy. The customary right of occupancy in Nigeria was nonalienable, as was the
Native American aboriginal title. To some extent the policies in both countries reflect paternal-
ism. In the case of Nigeria, there is a tradition of the tribal and village elders supervising com-
munal life. The paternalism in the United States is more malevolent, being based on
Anglo-American ethnocetricity. Both Native American and Nigerian cultures have a strong
tradition of communal ownership of land. For a discussion of court cases and laws relevant to




2356 S.C. 363 (1984).
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requirement is not met when the right of occupancy is revoked in order to
give the same right to another citizen.236 The courts have further restricted
a governor's power by holding that the revocation process requires more
than notice. The holder of the right of occupancy has the right to be heard.
Furthermore, the governor must specify which of the public purposes listed
in §50(1) of the Act is applicable in a particular revocation.237
D. Property and Corruption
A major concern in the relation of government to private property and
wealth is corruption, the fear that those in power reward friends by naked
transfers under colour of law. American pluralism of the Madisonian
variety aims almost directly at checking the corrupting influence of power
and wealth on the civic virtue of the elected leadership and government, but
recognising that benefits often accrue to the winners and their friendly
factions. Property, when widely shared in each culture, on the other hand,
serves the important function of checking unbridled governmental power or
corruption. The constitutions of each country do not define property,
leaving it to the customary or statutory law, but both do protect it from
takings for public purpose without compensation. Thus, the institution of
private property protected in the American and Nigerian Constitutions,
when considered alongside the affirmative social and economic policies also
made explicit in different ways in the two Constitutions, serve human rights
by limiting power, even if in the public process private wealth accumulates
disproportionately and sometimes corrupts. One remedy Madison proposed
was the term of office and elections to prevent excessive corruption yielding
tyranny. In Nigeria, the remedy has been a less than satisfactory political
solution, for corruption has been rampant. A military solution has
emerged; it ousts a corrupt civilian regime through benevolent action of a
new military regime. Nationalistic and potentially subject to the same forces
of corruption, the military regime governs for a limited time, until elections
are called and a new civilian government installed.
CONCLUSION
The United States has worked out its own history beginning in a
colonial past with aspirations of freedom and strong civil order amidst an
anarchistic or libertarian streak. Nigeria reflects its own traditions, with
quite different political underpinnings. Ethnic and customary practices
survive notwithstanding the colonial era, while modern Nigeria draws upon
a post-World War II tradition of human rights. Each country aspires for
equal liberty with varying degrees of civility and tolerance in the public
236 Foreign Finance Corp. Ltd. v. L.S.D.P.C. & Ors, unreported suit No. ID/552/80 (1980),
aff'd CA/L/18/85 (1987).
237 See Note, Revocation Process: Obikoya & Sons Ltd. v. Governor of Lagos State (1987)
1 NWLR (Pt. 50) 385, L.S.D.P.C. v. Foreign Finance Corporation Ltd. (1987) 1 NWLR (pt.
50) 415, 8-9 J. of Private and Property Law 102 (1987-1988) (authored by A. Utuarna).
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discourse depending upon cultural traditions; and each remains committed
to freedom, especially through constitutional limits on the political
branches determined by the courts in both countries. There is greater tradi-
tional deference in Nigerian courts to the political branches and customary
law of communities.
Concerning the human condition, struggles in these diverse cultures to
identify fundamental values and maintain respect for them in vastly different
developing and post-industrial societies are tasks more formidable than they
have ever been for single societies. The universal human aspirations enun-
ciated in Roosevelt's Four Freedoms speech-the freedom to speak and
publish freely; the freedom to worship according to one's own conscience;
the freedom from fear of violence and war; and the freedom from needing
food, shelter or education-have powerful but different contemporary lives
in Nigeria and in the United States. This article compared the most important
differences and similarities, and these may be summerised as follows:
A. Difference and Similarity in Constitutional Theory
In the United States, a belief in the corrupting influence of power led to
republicanism and a system of government which separated powers along
functional lines and to the division of state from national power. The
founders also believed that the large geographic area comprising the
national territory insured that no faction would be able to capture the
national government. The judicial branch further serves to protect minority
interests from temporary legislative majorities through its review of state
and congressional legislation under a Bill of Rights now mostly applicable
as against all government.
In contrast, modern Nigeria did not begin in a tradition of civic
republicanism; its tradition is one of traditional obas or chiefs operating
through customary law. Nonetheless, starting in 1979, its constitutions have
reflected the decision to separate government into three branches and divide
it between the federal and state governments. The judicial branch in Nigeria
is far more deferential to the political branches than federal courts are in the
United States because in part reflecting a British tradition of parliamentary
supremacy, the Nigerian Supreme Court has not achieved the same ability
as the American Supreme Court to strike down laws or policies in conflict
with the constitution.
The two constitutions also differ in that core freedoms in the American
Constitution are expressed as negative restraints upon government, limiting
the state's capacity to intrude too far in the tradition of classic liberalism.
The Nigerian Constitution organically prescribes positive guarantees to
citizens and duties and responsibilities of citizens to each other. The
document reflects a tradition of communitarianism, an organic conception
of the state. In practice, incentives induce private co-operation in the United
States; and restraints on power limit government in Nigeria.
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B. Difference in Core Freedoms
1. Preferences
Both countries have enacted preferential policies for certain racial and
ethnic groups. The practices, widely disputed, find support in the inter-
national convention on the elimination of racial discrimination. In the
United States, affirmative action policies initially sought to overcome the
effects of slavery by equal access to public goods. These policies later
expanded to provide entitlements and these were extended to encompass
other minorities and women and saw the rise of new opposition groups and
a constitutional reaction against "reverse discrimination". In Nigeria the
numerically dominant Hausa-Fulani used preferential policies to displace
the Ibo from schools and government positions, especially after the civil
war, allegedly evening the playing field, compensating for the lack of
schools in the Hausa-Fulani area during the period of British rule.
2. Freedom of Expression
Both countries value freedom of expression, stated as a limit on the govern-
ment's ability to regulate speech and press in the United States and stated as
an affirmative entitlement in Nigeria. Nigeria's constitutional provisions
are similar to the international agreements that limit the freedom of expres-
sion when necessary to protect the rights or reputation of others, the
national security or public health or morals. The American Constitution has
no such provisions, but the Supreme Court has recognised similar restric-
tions on freedom of expression. The limitations are more tightly drawn,
however, than in Nigeria or in the international agreements. Unlike Nigeria,
the United States has no Official Secrets Act, but the Espionage Act and
employment contracts have been used to limit the dissemination of govern-
ment information. The American Court requires a compelling national
interest, usually defined as an immediate threat to security or incitement to
imminent lawless behaviour, to restrict speech. Also unlike the law in
Nigeria, if the defamation plaintiff in the United States is a public official
or figure, then he or she must prove malice as well as falsity. Nigerian libel
law has not been constitutionalised.
3. Religious Liberty
The two countries' constitutions as well as pertinent international agree-
ments and standards value the fundamental right of religious liberty. The
United States differs in demanding greater separation of church and state.
For example, in Nigeria non-coercive religious instruction is permitted in
government-financed schools. Both countries struggle with accomodating
majoritarian beliefs of community or ethnic regions) while protecting the
religious freedoms of all. Nigeria is more concerned with seeking to reduce
potential violence or upheaval from religious conflict than the United States
has been. The United States seeks to limit the more subtle effects of
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religious conflict through public policies to accomodate the dominant reli-
gious majorities so long as they do not coerce minorities.
4. Property
Private property is protected but not granted in both constitutions. Each re-
quires compensation for private property taken for public use. The Nigerian
Constitution broadens public ownership of important public goods such as
subsurface minerals and communications. The American Supreme Court has
defined public use more expansively than have the courts in Nigeria when con-
sidering the power to take property for a public purpose so long as compensa-
tion is provided. In further contrast, the Land Use Act of 1978 gives the
Nigerian state governors considerable power over land in their states, and
statutory and customary rights of occupancy are important in Nigeria, while
common law remains the cornerstone of American property law.
C. Standing in Another Culture's Time and Place
Both in developing countries and in advanced democracies the struggles for
core freedoms amidst cultural diversity in a global society are daunting. The
comparative method used in this article of analysing differences in key free-
doms in structure and culture between the two countries and in emerging
international norms, requires standing in another society's time, place and
cultural values. Attempting that, we find these common values:
1. Written positive guarantees mean nothing without political will and
negative restraints do not themselves define the common good.
2. Unifying aspirations and ideals are expressed in the Constitution as a
national story of founding or creation.
3. Each society values judicially-protected limits to state coercion, public
power and corruption.
4. Each society values community development through the process of non-
state wealth production and distribution, with concern for exploitation
and compensation of private property is taken for public purpose.
5. Each culture values respect for personal and group expression,
enlightenment and autonomy.
6. Each culture values co-operation by individuals in achieving
community goals and has suspicion of public officials but not so
frequently community leaders.
If national elites and average citizens alike can place themselves inside
another country to imagine what the human condition there is like, and if
each human being is capable of the same imagination with other human
beings within their own diverse cultures, only then might we understand
whether anything of fundamental value to one culture or race is common to
another or important enough to unite us in co-operation toward common
goals through enlightened common interest to escape the cares of our own
ethnic or national ignorance.
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